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Abstract:
This paper explores the impact of autocratic rule on social capital—defined as the be-
liefs, attitudes, norms and perceptions that support cooperation. Political repression is
a distinguishing characteristic of autocratic regimes. Between 1660–1788, individuals in
imperial China were persecuted if they were suspected of holding subversive attitudes
towards the state. A di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach suggests that in an average pre-
fecture, exposure to those literary inquisitions led to a decline of 38% in local charities—a
key proxy of social capital. Consistent with the historical panel results, we find that in
a↵ected prefectures, individuals have lower levels of generalized trust in modern China.
Taking advantage of institutional variation in 20th c. China, and two instrumental vari-
ables, we provide further evidence that political repression permanently reduced social
capital. Furthermore, we find that individuals in prefectures with a legacy of literary
inquisitions are are more politically apathetic. These results indicate a potential vicious
cycle in which autocratic rule becomes self-reinforcing through causing a permanent
decline in social capital.
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Terror can rule absolutely only over men who are isolated against each other and that,
therefore, one of the primary concerns of all tyrannical government is to bring this isolation
about.
Hannah Arendt (1951, p. 474)
I Introduction
The striking resilience of autocracy in China has attracted scholarly attention in recent years
(Nathan, 2003). Though explanations have been o↵ered, the combination of autocratic resilience
and relative economic success, remains an unresolved puzzle. In this paper, we o↵er a new expla-
nation to this puzzle by taking into account China’s long history as an autocratic state, how it has
weakened civil society in the past, and how this has led to more autocracy.1
The relationship between the state and civil society is a long-standing question in the social
sciences. Alexis de Tocqueville argued in Democracy in America (1835) that a thriving civil society
supports a vibrant democracy.2 Meanwhile, Acemoglu and Robinson (2016) observe that state
policies and behavior a↵ect the nature and extent of social capital—i.e. those beliefs, attitudes,
norms and perceptions that support cooperation. We provide empirical evidence connecting these
two arguments, showing that the negative consequences of autocratic rule for civil society can in
turn explain the resilience of modern day autocracies.
Understanding the historical trajectory of China, a long-standing autocracy, is of central im-
portance for understanding how autocracy became entrenched over time. We focus on political
repression—a distinguishing feature of autocratic rule—and investigate its role in China’s autocratic
resilience via the transformation of civil society. The unique historical shock we exploit generated
quasi-random variation in the perception of the autocratic state, providing novel evidence on the
impact of autocracy on the fabric of society.
We examine a period during which the premodern autocratic imperial state came to be per-
fected. Following the Qing occupation of China in 1644, imperial China saw a new wave of political
repression and a further entrenchment of autocratic rule. This major historical shock produced
exogenous variation across time and space, in how that state was perceived by the population it
governed. The intellectuals or gentry, who played an important role in civil society, saw new restric-
tions imposed on their behavior and speech and were subjected to persecutions—known as literary
inquisitions. We explore the impact of these persecutions on civil society.
In terms of their impact on society, literary inquisition cases were far-reaching; this “expansive
. . . repression involved the entire population” (Wang, 2002, p. 647). The early 19th century poet,
Gong Zizhen, observed that intellectuals were disengaged from society, and withdrew from public
1See Gregory, Schro¨der, and Sonin (2011) for a study of repression in the Soviet Union. In 2017, China is ranked
144th out of 145 countries on the 2015 CAF World Giving Index.https://www.forbes.com/sites/ceibs/2016/07/26/
chinas-philanthropy-gap/#302ef0682b56
2This insight has been expanded upon by many social scientists who link social capital to democracy. See
Fukuyama (1995), Fukuyama (2001), Putnam (1994), Tabellini (2008), Gorodnichenko and Roland (2015), and
Martinez-Bravo, Padro-i-Miquel, Qian, Xu, and Yao (2017).
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gatherings, in fear of literacy inquisitions. He lamented that when intellectuals in his time wrote
books, they only did so only to make a living and that they had become indi↵erent to developing
and spreading new ideas (Gong, 1991). Historians concur that “[f]ear of persecution left a deep
negative impact on cultural and intellectual life” (Wang, 2002, p. 647). As other individuals had to
report any “inappropriate” speech, the risks associated with developing close relations with one’s
peers dramatically increased. According to historians, this policy of systematic repression “led to
the formation of a social environment characterized by mutual deception”.
The following stylized facts are important to understanding the sources of variation that we
rely on in this paper. First, there was no separation between the executive and the judiciary in
imperial China. Embedded in the Confucian ideal of government was the notion that at each level of
government, important decisions should be ultimately made by the magistrate, provincial governor
or emperor—individuals believed to be “virtuous” because of the Confucian values they embodied—
rather than by the law alone. Given this, inevitably, the determination of literary inquisitions cases
was highly subjective and lacked consistency across cases. Second, in the process of investigating
and prosecuting inquisitions cases, the sheer size of Qing China and institutional complexity of the
personalized Chinese bureaucracy introduced a high degree of uncertainty and subjectivity.3 Third,
the centralization of all political and legal authority in the hands of the emperor meant that his
subjective judgment was particularly important. While at every level of the bureaucracy, there was
room for discretion, the only individual with complete discretion was the emperor who was the final
arbitrator of all inquisition cases (Huang, 1974, p. 208).4
The emperor could be both ruthless and, from time to time, unexpectedly lenient. For example,
one individual was persecuted for writing: “Since the clear wind does not recognize words, Why does
it flip through the pages of my book?” Since the Chinese character for “Qing” has the connotation
“clear”, this could be interpreted as criticism of the Qing “who were implicitly depicted as illiterate
barbarians masquerading as arbiters of literary tastes” (Gu, 2003, p. 127).
Another seemingly similar case ended very di↵erently. The censors reported an author for the
following passage: “Facing the bright moon, one becomes a good friend./Inhaling the clear wind,
one falls a drunken lord.” These words were suspect as “‘bright moon’ could be viewed a reference
to the salutary moral power of the (previous) Ming dynasty” (as “bright” is the same character as
“Ming”). In this case, however, the scholar, his family and others involved in the case were spared
punishment when the emperor changed his mind at the last minute, writing: “‘Clear wind’ and
‘bright moon’ are commonly used words in poetry and essays. How can one avoid using them?”
(Gu, 2003, p. 127). Literary inquisitions indeed represented “the institutionalization of Imperial
subjectivity” (Wakeman, 1998, p. 168).
To understand why the Qing state conducted literary inquisitions, we employ a simple signaling
3In an e↵ort to combat nepotism, o cials were routinely rotated every three years, so that their decisions were
insulated from local influences. Within the bureaucracy, it was possible for cases to be dropped at any time by the
magistrate or by the provincial governor or due to reprieves issued by the emperor.
4The emperor often had never met the individuals involved in cases passed along to him. This goes against the
possibility that inquisition cases were mere artifacts of the premeditated removal of political opponents.
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model. In this model, regimes that lack legitimacy use persecutions to signal strength and their
ability to suppress all potential opposition. In a separating equilibrium, strong rulers persecute and
their subjects are less likely to rebel as a result. This framework crystallizes the rationale behind
persecutions in the absence of any overt opposition.
From the point of view of identification, the emperor’s subjective decision to dismiss, rather than
proceed with, a case could arbitrarily delay a prefecture’s initial exposure to literary inquisitions by
decades. The same holds true if an incident was dismissed at any stage of the bureaucratic process.
In our historical panel, we make use of variation in both the location and timing of inquisition
cases. Prefecture fixed e↵ects deal with time invariant sources of endogeneity. Also, when we take
a further step by restricting our sample to prefectures that had at least one literary inquisition case
by the end of the sample period, we obtain very similar results.
The structure of our analysis is sketched in Figure 1. In our historical panel analysis, we
first demonstrate that literary inquisitions had an impact on the number of individuals to becom-
ing prominent or reputable. Using a dataset of well known individuals in imperial China, and a
di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach, we find that following a persecution, there was a decline in the
number of individuals becoming reputable in a prefecture, a decline that was most concentrated
among individuals who came of age during the decade of a persecution. In an environment where
any public attention could only increase the chance of persecution, individuals ceased to engage
in activities that they would previously have considered safe and became more hesitant to put
themselves at risk.
After verifying that literary inquisitions had a “chilling e↵ect” on individuals, we begin our
analysis of their e↵ects on civil society. We measure social capital by the number of charities.5
These were small-scale, nonpartisan, local organizations that aided widows, looked after orphans,
ran soup kitchens, paid for the cost of burials, and helped the poor.6 For clarity, we refer to them
as “local charities” throughout.
We find that after a prefecture was exposed to a literary inquisition case, the number of charities
in that prefecture fell by an average of 38%, relative to prefectures that never had a persecution, or
prefectures that had not yet experienced a persecution. As the dataset we employ does not track
5These charities were apolitical. Unlike political organizations or societies, local charities were never directly
targeted by the autocratic government. This makes it a “clean” measure of underlying social capital in our panel
setting. A related logic is used in Satyanath, Voigtla¨nder, and Voth (2017), in which political organizations are
excluded from the pool of organizations when used to measure social capital.
6 Tsu (1912), Smith (1987), and Rankin (1990). This philanthropic activity reflected a “clearly articulated the
concept of a ‘public’ or ‘communal’ sphere, as opposed to a ‘state’ or ‘private’ sphere” (Rowe, 2009, p. 119) Prior to
1600, the state, and especially the clan, provided most of social services. From the 1600s onwards, charities began to
emerge that provided aid and relief on and indiscriminate basis and closely resembled modern charities. That said,
the desire to establish charities was largely influenced by traditional Chinese values such as neo-Confucian ideology
and Buddhist beliefs held by the gentry. We explain the connections between these intellectual movements and
the formation of charities in more detail in Appendix 1.F. Charities played an important role in premodern China
providing orphanages, disaster relief and other public goods (Simon, 2013) For more details about the role gentry
played in the provision of disaster relief see Ch’u¨ (1962). Simon notes that “[i]n many cases, these private e↵orts were
combined with the ones provided by local government o cials or by emperors and kings” (Simon, 2013, p. 60). They
were non-governmental organizations and played an important role alongside the government provision of disaster
relief studied by Shiue (2004).
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Figure 1: The structure of our analysis.
the closure of charities, the e↵ects we find are purely driven by divergent patterns in the formation
of new charities after a literary inquisition case. This allows us to conclude that there was a decline
in successful collaborative e↵ort in setting up charities in a↵ected prefectures.
We map out the full dynamic response of local charities to literary inquisitions and show that the
number of charities in a↵ected prefectures gradually declined for three decades, relative to una↵ected
prefectures, and remained at a lower level thereafter. This lack of recovery suggests local societies
in a↵ected prefectures switched to a new equilibrium in which fewer charitable activities took place
in general. To interpret this result, we rule out several alternative hypotheses, and conclude that
this sustained decline in charitable activities following literary inquisitions is most consistent with
the interpretation that literary inquisitions permanently altered beliefs and attitudes supportive of
cooperation and participation in civil society, i.e. social capital.
As shown in Figure 1, for the second part of our analysis we consider outcomes directly shaped
by social capital. We first regress literary inquisitions on indicators of social capital in the Chinese
General Social Survey: literary inquisitions consistently predict a lower level of generalized trust,
but do not a↵ect trust between family members.
We next provide a snapshot of the provision of basic education in the early 20th century. In
Qing and early Republican China, formal schooling at the level of basic education was rare. Primary
schools were provided by local communities. If the Qing persecutions a↵ected the cultural values
that sustained this cooperation (i.e. social capital), it would have had negative consequences for
the provision of public goods, including the provision of basic education. This should be more
evident when the provision was informal and decentralized. We find that individuals born in the
early 20th century were 5 percentage points less likely to be literate in prefectures that experienced
persecutions in the Qing Dynasty. This is roughly a third of the average literacy rate of the cohort
of individuals born in the 20th century who were surveyed in the 1982 census. These results are
not driven by di↵erential survivor rates between the literate and illiterate, and are not sensitive to
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controlling for historical shocks such as the Taiping Rebellion, the exodus to Taiwan following the
Chinese Civil War, and the Cultural Revolution.
Our historical panel analysis benefits from exploiting variation across both time and space.
The analysis further made use of the fact that di↵erent prefectures were first exposed to persecu-
tions in di↵erent points of time. When linking our treatment to modern outcomes, we lose this
source of variation in timing.7 To establish causality in a cross-sectional setting, we construct two
instrumental variables motivated by the character of the Qing take-over of China.
First, we exploit pre-existing levels of interactions between Manchus and Han Chinese as proxied
for by a prefecture’s distance to the pre-conquest Manchu capital. Distance to the pre-conquest
Manchu capital predicts political persecutions in the first stage, but are unlikely to a↵ect social
capital through other channels. Second, we employ a prefecture’s distance to the nearest base of the
Eight Banners as an instrument. The Eight Banners were imperial armies that were predominately
Manchu. The farther away a prefecture was from the Eight Banners, the more di cult for the
Qing state to dispatch troops in a timely fashion in the event of popular unrest. The lack of
nearby military presence aggravated the risks posed by unregulated speech. The first stage shows
that distance to the nearest Eight Banners is positively correlated with the incidence of literary
inquisitions. Our IV estimates are comparable to OLS estimates. We further demonstrate the
validity of our instruments with a test of overidentifiying restriction and a placebo test.
Next, we exploit urban-rural di↵erences in the provision of basic education. Social capital
should matter the most in places where public goods are provided locally and informally. For the
most part of the 20th century, primary schools in rural China closely match this criteria. Indeed,
we find that the e↵ect of literary inquisitions on basic education is concentrated in the rural sample.
Similarly, we exploit policy variation in the provision of basic education over time. The nega-
tive e↵ects of the Qing persecutions on literacy are evident for cohorts of individuals who reached
schooling age before the Nationalist government began to centralize the education system in the
1930s. The centralization of the education system should have temporarily weakened the link be-
tween social capital and the provision of basic education and hence to literacy. Our results suggest
that between the 1930s and 1960s, the e↵ect of the Qing persecutions on basic education is much
smaller. But a large negative e↵ect re-emerges for the cohorts educated during the Cultural Revo-
lution, when the provision of basic education became more dependent on local initiative, especially
in rural China. The fact that we find a much larger e↵ect when institutions were decentralized
indicates that social capital is an important channel underlying the persistent e↵ects of literary
inquisitions.
Finally, we explore the question whether autocracy leads to more autocracy from several di↵er-
ent angles. A recent survey of political attitudes of Chinese nationals, together with the Chinese
General Social Survey, facilitates our attempt to answer this question. We find that individuals in
a↵ected prefectures are less likely to engage in community a↵airs, more politically apathetic, but
7Literary inquisitions began to reduce charitable activities shortly after those events took place. After two
decades, the gap between charitable activities in a↵ected and una↵ected prefectures peaked, remaining more or less
constant for subsequent decades.
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actually have more progressive political attitudes. This implies that one consequence of political
repression is that the individuals who are more likely to support democratic reform, are also less
likely to be politically engaged. This, in turn, has implications for democratic self-governance.
Autocracy is more likely to become entrenched if likely supporters of reform are dissuaded from
political engagement. Echoing previous research that has found evidence for a virtuous democratic
cycle as longer experience of democracy improves economic performance which in turn further helps
to consolidate democracy, we point to the existence of a countervailing vicious autocratic cycle.8
II Relationship to the Literature
Our paper contributes to several strands of scholarship. First, we contribute to the literature on
the importance of social capital. Following Tocqueville, scholars such as Putnam (1994, 2001) have
argued that social capital is a crucial ingredient for democracy to function.9 Tabellini (2010) esti-
mates the e↵ects of cultural traits such as trust and respect for others, and confidence in individual
self-determination on current regional economic development in Europe.
The literature has been greatly advanced by relying on historical experiments for sources of
exogenous variation in contemporary social capital (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2016). One of the main challenges that this approach faces is taking a su ciently
comprehensive view of the many di↵erent ways a historical event could have influenced society
and the wide range of long-run e↵ects it could produce. In this respect, our setting o↵ers two
advantages: (i) We have historical information to test whether, in the first place, the historical
shock we examine indeed had an immediate impact on social capital. (ii) The historical shock in
question was also highly specific and its reach was relatively well-defined. We show that literary
inquisitions a↵ected the position and mentality of intellectuals, but had few other consequences.
In addition, usually, culture and institutions evolve together, which complicates the identification
of culture as an independent transmission mechanism. In this paper, we can estimate the e↵ects
of the historical shock on social capital long after local institutions were abolished or lost most
of their functions, as China increased the capacity of its highly centralized state after 1949. This
aids empirical identification of the cultural channel as those local institutions no longer have an
economic e↵ect on local populations.10
8See (Persson and Tabellini, 2009) for discussion of a virtuous democratic cycle. For the evidence for the positive
relationship between democracy and economic growth (Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, and Robinson, 2017).
9There is a large literature on the relationship of social capital to democracy. Other studies find that the
relationship between social capital and inclusive institutions is ambiguous. Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014)
and Satyanath, Voigtla¨nder, and Voth (2017) find that the relationship between autocracy, democracy and social
capital can be more complex, particularly in the presence of political instability and extractive institutions. This
suggests that social capital may be a necessary but not a su cient condition for democracy to flourish. Recent
research has also shown that social capital a↵ects other variables such as the level of regulation (Aghion, Algan,
Cahuc, and Shleifer, 2010).
10Had literary inquisitions had long-lasting negative economic e↵ects, it would be less surprising to find that they
also negatively a↵ected trust and other measures of social capital. Similarly, if literary inquisitions led to di↵erent
local institutions which persist to today, their e↵ects on social capital will not be distinguishable from the direct
e↵ects of literary inquisitions on social capital. Such local institutions could be local charities or schools. Had
they persisted to today they could influence social capital through a lower level of human capital, health, or more
inequality and poverty.
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More broadly, our work allows us to answer the question: How does the state shape society?
This has been considered by numerous sociologists and political scientists such as Skocpol (1979),
Moore (1966), and Ostrom (1997). We provide empirical evidence on the long-run consequences of
rule by an unconstrained, autocratic, state.11
Empirical evidence on the e↵ects of the state on civil society is mixed. Recent research suggests
that the presence of strong states can increase trust and help build a sense of common purpose
(Becker, Boeckh, Hainz, and Woessmann, 2016; Johnson, 2015) and that bureaucratic states are
associated with a legacy of greater social capital and public goods provision (Dell, Lane, and
Querubin, 2017). In contrast, a pioneering study, using field experiments together with a historical
case study of the Kuba Kingdom, suggests that the establishment of a powerful state can crowd
out trust and pro-social values (Lowes, Nunn, Robinson, and Weigel, 2017).
One way to reconcile these findings is to recognize that states provide a bundle of institutions
and that the e↵ects of individual component of this bundle do not always coincide in sign. On the
one hand, there are tangible benefits from the formation of a stable and centralized state (Besley
and Persson, 2011). In contrast to sub-Saharan Africa, where Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2014) have shown that national institutions have little impact away from the capital, China was a
highly centralized state by premodern standards. The centralized institutions of a state like Qing
China guaranteed internal peace and provided a stable environment in which commerce and markets
could flourish (Pomeranz, 2000; Shiue and Keller, 2007). Strong states can provide an institutional
framework that is conducive to the development of civil society. On the other hand, states are not
built in a vacuum. The process through which political order is created and maintained can be
extremely violent, particularly in autocratic states that lack political legitimacy, as was the case in
Qing China. Holding other characteristics of Qing institutions constant, we find that the e↵ect of
a crucial aspect of the autocratic state—political repression—is negative on civil society.
We contribute to a nascent literature on the origin and persistence of autocratic regimes.12 For
most of history, autocracy has been the most prevalent form of government. While this changed with
the waves of democratization that took place in the late 20th century (Huntington, 1993), recent
years have seen democratic reversals and the strengthening of autocratic rule in many countries.13
In this paper, we uncover a novel mechanism through which political repression makes autocracy
more stable in the long run: we show that a lower level of social capital is an important consequence
of political repression, which, in turn, can cripple the decentralized provision of public goods leading
individuals to be more favorably inclined to a strong centralized state. In addition, pervasive apathy
and a lower level of political participation, both of which are legacies of autocratic rule, can make
the population partially complicit in the institutional status quo. Through its e↵ect on social
11The Chinese state did not have the scope or power of a modern totalitarian state. As we document in the
appendix a large historical literature points out that the fiscal and administrative capacity of the Chinese state was
not particularly high (see Sng, 2014; Vries, 2015).
12See Giuliano and Nunn (2013), Galor and Klemp (2017), Bentzen, Kaarsen, and Wingender (2017), and Dower,
Finkel, Gehlbach, and Nafziger (2017) for recent research on the roots of democracy and autocracy. Important
treatments include Tullock (1987), Wintrobe (1998), and Mesqita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith (2003).
13See discussions in Brownlee (2002), Nathan (2003), and Diamond and Plattner (2015).
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capital, Qing-era political repression e↵ectively reduced the possibility of democratic reform in the
long-run.14
One virtue of our study is that our historical experiment is set within an existing autocracy.
This helps us address the concern that societies have a di↵erent propensity for autocracy, due to
underlying societal characteristics such as their level of population diversity (Galor and Klemp,
2017). In this case, predetermined characteristics that led to low social cohesion may also lead to
autocracy. We mitigate this concern about negative selection by studying variation within a relative
homogeneous environment with a similar amount of exposure in the past.
Political repression is often accompanied by violence. The Qing persecutions certainly involved
the exercise of violence against potential political dissidents. However, the e↵ects of the Qing
persecutions, however, are not to be confused with the e↵ect of mass violence, as in the case of
Holocaust or Cultural Revolution.15 Mass violence tends to have direct economic consequences
through the large-scale destruction of physical and human capital. Relatively few people were
executed as a result of literary inquisitions. It was the psychological impact of the Qing persecutions
that extended far and wide and well beyond those directly a↵ected. Based on the pattern we observe
in historical data, those persecutions led to a gradual process in the decline of social capital, which
is power evidence that even in the absence of large-scale violence, autocratic rule can have powerful
and long lasting negative e↵ects on the fabric of society. Literary inquisitions represented a pure
shock to the “collective conscience” of the intellectual class.
Finally, we shed new light on social capital and the path to democracy, particularly in modern
China. Martinez-Bravo, Padro-i-Miquel, Qian, Xu, and Yao (2017) show that social capital is crucial
to the success of formal institutions, when villages in China began to adopt democratic institutions.
Our paper investigates the consequences of low social capital for public goods provision in 20th
century China. Meanwhile, we provide new insights into China’s “authoritarian resilience” (Nathan,
2003; Perry, 2007; Gallagher and Hanson, 2013). Our findings also relate to work by Fisman and
Wang (2010, 2015a, 2015b) which shows that personal connections and ties still a↵ect political and
economic outcomes in modern China. Our findings can be read in the context of recent studies
of protests against authoritarian rule in Hong Kong (Cantoni, Yang, Yuchtman, and Zhang, 2016;
Cantoni, Yang, Yuchtman, and Zhang, 2017). These studies point to the challenges involved in
mobilizing individuals to protest against authoritarian rule. We show that past autocratic rule has
helped to produce a culture of political disengagement and apathy, which might have perpetuated
autocracy by lowering political participation, including political protests against autocracy.
14Studying Nazi Germany, Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2014) show that public goods spending can help “buy” support
for autocratic rule. Lichter, Loe✏er, and Siegloch (2015) examine the impact of the Stasi during Communist rule on
social capital. Employing data on the the total number of Stasi agents at the demise of East Germany, they study
the e↵ect of state surveillance.
15 Acemoglu, Hassan, and Robinson (2011) examine the legacy of the Holocaust in Russia. Waldinger (2010)
finds negative e↵ects of the expulsion of predominantly Jewish scientists in Germany. Giles, Park, and Wang (2015)
use the “send-down” movement that took place during the Cultural Revolution to estimate the returns to schooling.
They find that the Cultural Revolution reduced high school and college completion rates. Li, Rosenzweig, and Zhang
(2010) find that individuals who were “rusticated” or sent into the countryside did not in general experience worse
life outcomes; in fact in some dimensions they did better than individuals who were not sent down.
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III Historical Setting & Conceptual Framework
Political Legitimacy in Qing China
In imperial China, political institutions have always been authoritarian. The period we study,
however, saw the intensification of imperial autocracy under the Qing dynasty. The power of the
emperor became more absolute. The imperial state became more intrusive and repressive and
increasingly willing to regulate ideas, speech and thoughts.
Recent scholarship has established that Qing China imposed relatively low taxes and provided
few public goods (Sng, 2014; Vries, 2015). As Ma and Rubin (2017) document, this was perfectly
compatible with the highly centralized nature of the Qing political system. The combination of low
taxes and unconstrained autocratic rule reflected the equilibrium choices made by Qing rulers.16
The state in Qing China was a leviathan state in the sense that it dominated civil society despite
having limited fiscal capacity.
The Qing state was more autocratic than previous dynasties in part because it had less le-
gitimacy. Traditionally, Chinese rulers sought legitimacy in Confucianism. Confucianism provided
powerful cultural support for autocratic rule. Obedience to imperial authority was seen as a natural
extension of obedience to the head of the family. Unfortunately, for the Manchu Qing dynasty, this
strategy was not readily available due to ethnocentricity of Han Chinese culture.17 A perceived lack
of legitimacy generated a sense of insecurity was made worse by the fact that Manchu population
was extremely small in comparison to the Han Chinese population they ruled (who made up more
than 90% of the population of Qing China). To mitigate this, Qing rulers adopted a variety of
strategies, including political repression.
From 1652 onwards, individuals were prohibited from meeting to discuss ideas and severe cen-
sorship was implemented banning individuals from owning suspect literature.18 Private academies,
which in the late Ming period had become places where intellectuals could engage in policy debate,
were shut down (Dardess, 2002) and the imperial academies were purged on the grounds that they
were suspected of encouraging factionalism.19 The Qing also embarked on a campaign of propa-
ganda. County magistrates organized lectures to instill the principle that the filial obedience sons
owed their fathers extended to the emperor (Hung, 2011, pp. 35-36). In particular, Qing rulers
became highly sensitive to comments by Han intellectuals, especially if they appeared to undermine
the basis for Qing rule. They greatly expanded the scope of treason in the Qing Penal Code—any
speech that can be inferred to embody hostility to the regime or raise questions about the legitimacy
of the rulers, became su cient to constitute the grounds for “treason”.
16Ma and Rubin (2017) argue that it was precisely the fact that the authority of the Qing emperor was uncon-
strained that meant that the state did not invest in administrative capacity.
17The emergence of a sense of Han Chinese ethnic/national identity is dated to the Song dynasty by historians (see
Tackett, 2017). This ethnocentricity was strongly tied to Confucianism. The Qing state did try to seek legitimacy
in an updated variant of Confucianism known as neo-Confucianism. See Appendix 1.F.
18This category even included “frivolous fiction”. Eventually three of the four classic works of Chinese literature
were prohibited. Historians speculate that some of the later chapters of The Dream of the Red Chamber were
destroyed by their author Cao Xueqin due to fear of being persecuted.
19See Chen and Jiang (1725), Huang (1974), and Wakeman (1998).
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Literary Inquisitions
Relations between intellectuals and the state in imperial China were the product of long his-
torical gestation. Under the first emperor of China tens of thousands of books were burned and
hundreds of scholars executed in an attempt to build a unified ideology. This event, widely known as
fen shu keng ru (210 BCE), set the tone for the relationship between rulers and intellectuals.20 The
Qing takeover of power after 1644 represents another major shock to the status of intellectuals.21
As foreign occupiers, the Manchu Qing rulers perceived that their right to rule was fragile in face of
a Han Chinese majority. It quickly became necessary to regulate ideology: private academies were
closed, curricula changed, societies shut down, and most dramatically, intellectuals were persecuted
for their speech and writings even in the absence of any actual acts of opposition. As a result
of these persecutions—known as literary inquisitions—the status of intellectuals became degraded
further, their personal safety and that of their families put into question.
Literary inquisitions (we´nz`ıyu`) were “legal punishment for criminal acts committed through
speech and written words expressed in various forms, including conversations, letters, essays, poems,
pamphlets, books, dramas, novels, and diaries” (Fu, 1994, p. 131). As there was no independent
legal system; all cases were investigated and processed by the imperial bureaucracy.
The ability to write and express ideas were key to the identity of intellectuals. Yet, throughout
Chinese history, speech and writings were always restricted. Even prior to the Qing period, there
was a long tradition of indirect or esoteric writing in Chinese history. As a survival strategy, writers
were habituated to disguising their political views and criticisms in the form of poetry or historical
commentaries. As a result, a wide range of speech and writings attracted the attention of the Qing
government, from diaries, memorials, clan rules, genealogies, inscriptions, epitaphs, dictionaries to
many others. The punishment they received could be “shockingly harsh” (Wang, 2002, p. 612).
Examining these cases closely we find cases where an individual displayed grief and nostalgia
for previous (Han Chinese) dynasties, or interpreted a canonic Confucian text in his own way. In
other cases, an individual used a character which turned out to o↵end the emperor, or employed
language that the emperor decided that he did not like. Poetic works with “excessive anger” or
“excessive hate,” could be o↵enses, as could expressions of “sorrow” regarding specific episodes in
history, or even “[r]ash fortune-telling and discussion of military strategy . . .Most of the cases had
an extremely tenuous link, if any, to anti-Manchu ideology” (Wang, 2002, p. 628).22
The political repression that took place in the Qing period a↵ected all of society, but it especially
a↵ected the class of intellectuals known as gentry. After 1000 AD, these individuals were typically
20Further adjustments to the relationship between intellectuals and rulers occurred during the Song period under
the shadow of Neo-Confucianism.
21A Google search, conducted in September 2017, yields 656,000 results for “fen shu keng ru” (in Chinese). “Wen
zi yu” (literary inquisitions) gives 947,000 results.
22Though they were studied by numerous scholars in the early and mid-20th century (e.g. Goodrich (1935),
Ch’i-ch’ao (1959), and Wiens (1969)), the literary inquisitions have not been the subject of a major study among
modern historians with the exception of Wang (2014). The existing literature comprises either narrative accounts,
detailed case studies (Spence, 2001), or comparatively brief mentions in more general accounts of Qing China. See,
for example, Gernet (1972, p. 506), Huang (1974, pp. 204–208), Guy (1987, pp. 166–179), and Kuhn (2002)). We
explicitly compare the Qing literary inquisitions to earlier persecutions in Appendix 1.B.
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graduates of the imperial examination system used to recruit candidates into the bureaucracy. But
only a portion of the intellectuals served in the bureaucracy; the rest, did not serve the government
formally. They were prominent in local society, assuming important roles in schools and charities,
which remained relatively independent of the state. In the absence of an European style aristocracy,
these were the only individuals who possessed any degree of influence or local power.
In Figure A.1 (Appendix 1.A), we illustrate the steps taken in a typical literary inquisition
case. The procedure involved was highly centralized. The Qing empire had a highly centralized
and hierarchical bureaucracy that was subordinated to the emperor. The authority of the emperor
was replicated at the provincial level in the authority of the governor, at the prefecture level in the
authority of prefect, and at the county level in the authority of magistrate. Governors, prefects and
magistrates were all appointed and rotated regularly. As a result, they did not have to respond
to local interests or concerns. Governors were responsible to the emperor alone.23 All information
concerning potential literary inquisition cases was passed up the chain of commander, eventually
reaching the emperor. Governors who failed to investigate cases, or to pass relevant information to
the emperor, could be punished as were others who failed to inform the authorities.
The decision to execute an individual was always made by the emperor and no o↵ense had to be
specified in advance for an investigation to occur and “[t]he range of accusations that could lead to
a literary inquisition was virtually unlimited” (Wang, 2002, p. 634). In the vast majority of cases,
the emperor had never met and never heard of the o↵ending individual.
A closer look at those cases suggests that individuals from vastly di↵erent backgrounds were
persecuted, ranging from poets to dictionary makers and from peddlers to fortune tellers.24 The
very arbitrariness of the literary inquisitions elevated the perceived power of the emperor. The
additional shock of a literary inquisition case arising, against the backdrop of an already highly
restrictive atmosphere, confirmed the absolute power possessed by emperor.
Example Cases
A Petitioner Individuals could not easily anticipate what might arouse the anger of the em-
peror. For example, Liu Zhengyu, a graduate of the lower level (shengyuan) exams, tried to
impress the emperor by submitting a proposal to reduce the frequency of peasant unrest. The
magistrate passed it on to the provincial governor. The governor passed the document to the
emperor. It was an o↵ense according to the Qing penal code for Liu to suggest state policy to
his superiors and the governor suggested that his shengyuan status to be taken from him for his
presumption (but not because he suspected him of treason). The emperor, however, reviewed
the entire proposal. He took o↵ense at Liu’s suggestion that the dress code for o cials be
changed, insisting that this was a suggestion that the dress should revert to what it has been
in Ming times. Though there was no evidence that this was Liu’s intent, he was immediately
executed.
23The Yongzheng emperor instituted an elaborate system which allowed lower-level o cials to directly report to
the emperor in secrecy. This institutional change further strengthened emperor’s control over the bureaucracy.
24None of the literary inquisitions cases, for instance, were about ethnic conflict.
11
A Dictionary Maker The character of these persecutions is further illustrated by the case of
Wang Xihou, a dictionary maker, accused by a village member. Wang was a respected figure
in his village. Having spent his life preparing for and taking exams, and compiling dictionaries,
he posed no threat to the emperor. Nevertheless, although the governor general and provincial
governor did not find anything overtly treasonous in Wang’s dictionary, when he passed the
case to the Qianlong emperor, the emperor decided that Wang should be punished on the
grounds that the dictionary did not show su cient deference to the dictionary commissioned
by the Qianlong emperor’s grandfather (Reischauer and Fairbank, 1958, p. 382). Specifically,
while praising the Kangxi dictionary Wang Xihou also commented that despite having 46,000
characters, it was still missing some entries. This incident occurred at a time when the Qianlong
emperor’s sensitivity to literary o↵enses was particularly acute. He was furious at Wang Xihou
and at the provisional governor who failed to find anything overly treasonous in Wang’s writings,
and who was nearly executed himself and was eventually exiled. Over 100 individuals ended
up being investigated. The publishers of the dictionary and those who wrote a preface for it
were punished as were Wang’s associates. Wang Xihou himself was sentenced to nine familial
exterminations, the most severe punishment available. He was executed, as were all his sons,
and 21 other members of his family were enslaved.25
A Writer’s Descendants There was no statue of limitations in imperial China. In 1730 a
literary inquisition case brought to light the writings of a certain Qu Dajun who had served
various Ming loyalist movements fighting the Manchus and had died in 1696. But over thirty
years later, fearing persecution, Qu Dajun’s son turned himself in for possessing his father’s
books as these books contained many passages that could be interpreted as being critical of the
Qing. Through these actions, he spared himself execution and was instead exiled. However,
almost 50 years later in 1774, two of his distant relatives were punished for the possession of Qu
Dajun’s writings. Ironically one was a half-literate peddler, the other an illiterate, who seems
to have preserved his writings out of reverence in spite of being unable to read them.
A Model
How can we rationalize such capricious persecutions? Why would the Qing state devote precious
resources to punishing individuals who were highly unlikely to pose a direct threat? A simple
signaling model can be used to understand how literary inquisitions were employed by the Qing
emperors. In the canonical Spence (1973) signaling model, an informed party takes a costly action to
communicate their type to an uninformed party. We adapt this framework to describe the situation
facing the Qing rulers of China. In our model, rulers vary according to their legitimacy and strength.
Legitimacy is common knowledge, but their strength is known to the ruler and not observed by
the population, who rebel if they believe the ruler to be illegitimate and weak. Rulers have the
option of conducting persecutions to reveal their strength. But because these persecutions are costly
and require considerable administrative capabilities—suspects have to be found and interrogated,
25Further detail about the case of Wang Xihou case are provided in Appendix 1.D.
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witnesses questioned, books and writings collected and studied—they are less costly for a strong
ruler to undertake and more costly for a weak ruler.
There is a separating equilibrium in which strong rulers from dynasties that lack legitimacy
employ political persecutions to signal their strength and ability to root out opposition. Weak
rulers find it too costly to conduct literary inquisitions. Rulers from legitimate dynasties have less
need to signal their strength and will be less likely to use persecutions. (see Appendix 2).26
This framework rationalizes several features of the Qing literary inquisitions and sheds light on
the example cases we reviewed. First, persecutions can occur in the absence of actual opposition.
This is consistent with what we observe in Qing China where literary inquisitions were not directed
at open critics of the regime (as there were none) nor at specific regions or provinces. The choice
of targets necessarily had a random component to it.
Second, there did not seem to be much consistency in the handling of literary inquisitions cases.
Since the primary goal of those persecutions was to signal the strength of a ruler, whether a decision
was made in line with an objective criteria was of secondary importance. It is, therefore, not too
surprising that the fate of the individual cases was highly variable given that it was up to the
opinion of the emperor and the criteria employed to determine guilt were subjective and impossible
to anticipate. Imperial paranoia determined the fate of individuals involved in literary inquisition
cases. The guilt of those accused of “word crime” was “in the eye of the beholder” i.e. the emperor
(Fu, 1994, p. 134).
Third, there was an emphasis on public punishment: “[p]ublic executions of literary culprits
were so visible and publicized that most people felt one must be very careful while making open
oral and written expressions” (Fu, 1994, p. 133). This allowed the authorities to signal the strength
and repressive capabilities of the state, but it also served the purpose of deterrence. Consistent
with a Beckerian (1968) framework in which it is rational to impose as severe a penalty as possible
in order to deter hard-to-detect crimes, in the majority of cases individuals were executed in public,
often through Lingchi (slow slicing).27
26Hence these persecutions di↵ered from decentralized persecution of religious minorities or witches in Europe as
scapegoats for economic downturns or disasters. These persecutions were often a way to minimize social disorder by
placing the blame on a specific minorities. This was not why literary inquisitions took place. Literary inquisition took
place during the High Qing period, a period during which the autocratic Chinese state was strong. As ethnic Manchus
the Qing lacked the legitimacy of native Han dynasties. The Kangxi, Yongzheng emperor, and Qianlong emperors,
however, were among the most powerful and successful rulers in Chinese history. The emperors who followed them,
the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796-1820), the Daoguang emperor (r. 1820-1850), and the Xianfeng emperor (r. 1850-1861)
were notably weaker rulers and they did not engage in persecutions.
27Lingchi can be translated as death by a thousand cuts. Literary inquisition cases were prominent and widely
publicized. Guy observes that “the emperor was using the Wang case to make a statement to the literary community
about his determination to preserve his dynasty’s reputation. The singling out of one o↵ender, repugnant though
it may seem today, was not an uncommon means of communicating, in the 18th century to a large and di↵use
community uncertain of Imperial directions” (Guy, 1987, p. 176). We detail other punishments used in literary
inquisition cases in Appendix 1.A.1.
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IV The Impact of Political Repression on Social Capital in
Imperial China
A Data Sources
Data on literary inquisitions are from Qing chao wen zi yu an (Qing literary inquisition cases)
(Zhang and Du, 1991). These have been collected and compiled by historians. A total of 86 cases
are included in Qing chao wen zi yu an, dating from 1661 to 1788. Zhang and Du (1991) is built
on archival work done by historians at the Qing Imperial Archives in the 1930s, Qing chao wen zi
yu dang (Archives of Museum of Forbidden City, 1934).28 Those records confirm that individuals
were investigated for speech and writing unaccompanied by overt acts of opposition.29
China proper was divided into 18 provinces and 275 prefectures. Figure 2 depicts the prefectural
boundaries of Qing China and displays the prefectures associated with victims of literary inquisitions
per quarter century.30
Regarding outcome variables, we first use Jiang (2005), a modern compendium of reputable
figures in Qing China, to estimate the e↵ect of literary inquisitions on the cohort size of reputable
individuals. This is to verify whether literary inquisitions had any sort of impact on society. Jiang
(2005) is encyclopedic. It includes approximately 25,000 individuals, who were born between 1562
and 1949, and well known for reasons that included economic and political prominence, impor-
tance in science and technology, medicine and healthcare, education, literary scholarship, artistic
or poetic achievements, or other actions that left an impact on society. For each individual, we
have information on their name, birth year, and hometown.31 In our main analysis, we focus on
individuals born between 1640 and 1819 from prefectures in our matched sample.32 The resulting
dataset comprises 3,509 individuals.33
Our main outcome variable is the number of local charities, which we use as a measure of
social capital. Social capital refers to the values and beliefs that support cooperation (Guiso,
28Historians complied 65 cases from three main sources: the archives of the Grand Council, palace memorials and
veritable records. All of them were primary sources.
29Magistrates, prefects and provincial governors were made personally responsible for detecting “literary o↵enses”.
O cials could be punished for omissions made by their sta↵; “[t]he names, ages, and addresses of suspicious men
were transmitted to government o ces” (Wang, 2002, p. 622). Given this incentive system, it is therefore highly
unlikely that o cials would fail to report cases to the emperor. As we detail in Appendix 3.D.1, we also employ a
more expansive list of so called “literary cases” in Table A.11. Many of those cases concerned openly anti-Manchu
movements or an outcome of factional politics among government o cials. The results we obtain using a more
expansive list have the same sign as our main estimates but are far less precisely estimated.
30There were three levels of administration in imperial China: the province, the prefecture and the county. There
were seven to thirteen prefectures per province. The average size of a prefecture in our matched sample was 15,000
square kilometers. The average size of prefectures in the entire Qing empire was larger than that in China proper.
Summary statistics for all data used in our analysis are provided in Appendix 3.A.
31In our dataset, we have information on birth years for 19,780 individuals. Jiang (2005) also mentions if an
individual had an alternative name and the original source on which the entry is based.
32More details on matching are available in Section 3.B
33While potential sampling issues might make this data problematic in a cross-section setting, our panel setting
allows us to exploit variation over time within a prefecture. To note, because Jiang (2005) was complied long after
the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, his selection criterion for a particular prefecture would have no reason to change
in fear of risks of persecution.
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Figure 2: Prefectures of individuals persecuted as a result of a literary inquisition per quarter century:
1725, 1750, 1775, 1800.
(a) Prefectures of Persecuted Individuals,
1700–1725.
(b) Prefectures of Persecuted Individuals,
1726–1750.
(c) Prefectures of Persecuted Individuals,
1750–1775.
(d) Prefectures of Persecuted Individuals,
1775–1800.
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2011).34 Charity data are taken from Liang (2001). This is regarded as the
most comprehensive compilation of charities in Qing China. For each charity, we know its name,
location, date of foundation, and the original source Liang consulted. To the best of our knowledge,
we pioneered the use of this database in statistical analysis in social sciences. Liang built her
database based on primary sources, most of which were local gazetteers.35 These charities relied
on cooperation between members of the same community, but often of di↵erent clans; they were
small-scale organizations; and there was no formal registration system.36 They provided help for the
34Social capital thus defined refers to bridging rather than bonding social capital. It closely maps into the concept
of generalized trust and is separate from family ties or individual-level, relationship-based advantages individuals
obtain from belonging to certain groups which may advantage them without increasing societal level cooperation.
35Local gazetteers are one of the most important data sources used in research based on Chinese history. There
are large di↵erences in gazetteer availability across prefectures, but as seen in Table A.9, our matched sample has
nice properties in terms of balancedness in gazetteer availability. Within our matched sample, treated and untreated
prefectures have a similar number of gazetteers, prefecture-level gazetteers or county-level gazetteers, regardless of
the gazetteer database in question.
36Historians have documented that, while traditionally these services were provided within the clan (Greif and
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indigent, support of orphans, famine relief, and helped to cover the costs of burials. Local charities
were often highly specialized and concentrated in providing a specific service to the community.
During the period we study, we are not aware of any changes in the policies or regulations faced by
charities.37
We include two types of controls: (i) time-invariant characteristics. Some time-invariant pre-
fecture characteristics could have a time-varying e↵ect on local charities, such as other measures
of social capital (Buddhist temples, funding agencies and linguistic fragmentation), urbanization,
trade and levels of development. We control for those characteristics interacted with decade fixed
e↵ects. We do the same for possible determinants of the location of literary inquisitions, such as the
number of conflicts in early Qing (1644-1690), the number of academies during the Ming period,
and the number of individuals who refused to work for the Qing government after the collapse of
the Ming; and (ii) time-varying factors. On the demand side, natural disasters such as floods might
increase demand for charity services. We use the Central Meteorological Bureau of China (1981)
for information on floods and droughts. Conflicts also increased demand for charities. We take
conflict data from Chen (1939). We then control for the flow of human capital, as proxied by the
number of examination graduates (jinshi) who acquired their degree during that decade (Zhu and
Xie, 1980). Lastly, we look at alternative outcomes for which we do not expect to see an e↵ect,
such as government-sponsored academies, coded from Ji (1996). Additional variables are used in
further robustness checks. For details on all the variables see Appendix 3.F.
B Identification
We estimate the e↵ect of literary inquisitions on local charities in a di↵erence-in-di↵erences
framework. We use the prefecture-decade as the unit of observation. Di↵erent prefectures in our
sample received treatments at di↵erent points in time. Therefore, for each decade, the composition
of our treatment and control groups is di↵erent. At each point in time, the control group comprises
all prefecture-decades that have not seen a literary inquisition case.38
The key assumption is that, in the absence of the treatment, i.e. a literary inquisition case, the
change in the number of local charities would have been the same for both a↵ected and una↵ected
prefectures.
We consider a prefecture “treated” when it is exposed to a literary inquisition case, where
exposure is defined as the first occurrence of a persecution of an individual from the prefecture
in question.We also experiment with alternative specifications in which we estimate the e↵ects of
subsequent cases separately. A literary inquisition case would have sent out a clear signal about the
autocratic nature of the regime, and the absolute and arbitrary power possessed by the emperor.
Tabellini, 2012), by the Qing period these voluntary associations had expanded to provide relief to those outside of
the clan; they were seen to represent a contribution to the community (Rowe, 2009).
37It is worth pointing out that to be a source of potential bias such changes in policy stance would have to be
region specific. In China, however, local magistrates were given no authority to make laws or institute policies on
their own.
38For prefectures that never had an inquisition, all prefecture-decades are in the control group. For prefectures
eventually a↵ected by literary inquisitions, the prefecture-decades prior to the first literary inquisition case is in the
control group, all prefecture-decades afterwards are in the treatment group.
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This would deliver a shock to individuals’ understanding of their status relative to the state. Pre-
vious assumptions about the type of activities going to get one into trouble were overturned—from
this point onwards, it became clear that instead of overt acts of opposition, speech and thoughts
alone, could be grounds for punishment, and that all of this was entirely subject to the interpreta-
tion and will of the emperor. It was also a shock to interpersonal relationships. In such a climate
of suspicion, the dominant strategy for an individual was always to report if he saw any behavior
that could turn into a literary inquisition case. This posed severe constraints on the quality of ties
and connections that could develop horizontally between individuals.
Each literary inquisition was largely an exogenous shock to subjects living in the prefecture.
The Qing Imperial Archives contain extremely detailed information about literary inquisition cases.
Many cases had origins in civil disputes that were largely apolitical.39 They were the type of cases
that could happen virtually anywhere in the country. Unlike regular criminal cases in which clear
legal clauses would apply, there was no widely agreed upon criterion for what counted as an o↵ense
for which an individuals should be punished. Whether an investigation took place depended on the
discretion of magistrate, prefect, provincial governor, and ultimately on the attitude of the emperor.
At no point could this process be easily influenced by those who were outside of the bureaucratic
system (that is to say, virtually all subjects in the prefecture). Even if incidents emerged locally
and the probability of which were determined by prefecture characteristics, the process through
which they had to go through to reach the imperial court was so uncertain that the outcome of
two incidents from two prefectures that were similar in every dimension, would not be the same.
The nature of the political process governing literary inquisitions that we discussed in Section III
thus generated quasi-experimental variation in both the location, and especially the timing of first
literary inquisition case for each location.
In examining the impact of literary inquisitions at the level of the prefecture, we are not claim-
ing that there was no e↵ect of those literary inquisition cases on aggregate. If information about
persecutions had spread freely, any attempt to detect the local impact of a literary inquisition case
would unconvincing. But information did not flow freely in the premodern world. The absence
of newspapers or other forms of media meant that information spread slowly and within a limited
geographical range. Although a small number of individuals were probably exposed to such in-
formation regardless of where those literary inquisition cases took place, the vast majority of the
population, including the local gentry, had much better knowledge of literary inquisition cases in
their own locality.40 Thus we expect there to have been a substantial local component to the e↵ect
of an literary inquisition case.
We examine the e↵ect of literary inquisitions on populations in the prefecture that the perse-
39For this reason, inquisition cases tended to be bottom-up, but highly isolated events. This made literary
inquisitions very di↵erent from European witchcraft trials. There were no waves of literary inquisition cases as
occurred in the European witch panics) and which were often driven by local economic shocks and bad weather. The
closest that China experienced to such mass-driven panics was the soul-stealers episode studied by Kuhn (1990).
40One channel through which information spread within a local area was the imperial examination system. The
gentry were basically individuals who passed a certain level of imperial exams. A far larger number of individuals
sat for the prefecture-level exams than for say, province-level and national-level exams.
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cuted individual belonged to. Confucian culture, ancestor worship, and the agnatic linage system
meant that an individual’s families, clans and his identity were firmly lodged in his hometown.
At a policy level, migration, county-to-county, prefecture-to-prefecture or province-to-province, was
strictly controlled by the Confucian state. Although it was quite common for educated individ-
uals (particularly those who graduated from the examination system) to be employed in another
province or prefecture, they routinely returned to their home prefectures. Internal migration took
place mainly in the form of poor and marginal individuals moving into previously unsettled regions.
Data tend to be poor for those regions. We exclude them from our main sample.
B.1 Matching
One of the key assumptions of a di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimation strategy is that potential
outcomes are independent of treatment status, conditional on past outcomes (Abadie, 2005). When
control units are vastly di↵erent from treated units, this assumption often does not hold. One
solution is to match on pre-treatment covariates and to discard units which are not su ciently
similar to the treated units.
Literary inquisition cases largely arose as a byproduct of idiosyncratic actions of individuals.
Nevertheless, prefecture characteristics could still play a role in determining the likelihood of a lit-
erary inquisition. For example, typically, some level of literacy was a precondition for an individual
to have produced speech and writings in the first place. There was, so to speak, a mechanical
relationship between the proportion of literate individuals and the occurrence of literary inquisi-
tion cases. As expected, “treated” prefectures—prefectures that experienced a literary inquisition
case—di↵ered systematically from untreated prefectures in terms of characteristics such as popula-
tion, prior stock of human capital, and economic development. Because in prefectures with better
initial conditions, the number of charities would likely have been much higher in the absence of a
persecution, a simple comparison between treated and untreated prefectures will mask the impact
of literary inquisitions, producing biased coe cients of the e↵ect of literary inquisitions.
Following best practice described in Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart (2007), before implementing
a di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimation, we apply matching methods to the raw data and construct a
comparison group more comparable to the prefectures a↵ected by literary inquisitions (see Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd, 1997; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Abadie, 2005). From the late Ming period
onwards, the number of local charities was on the rise. Prefectures with very di↵erent characteristics
were likely to experience di↵erential trends in the provision of charity.
We condition our sample on a minimal set of pre-treatment covariates, such as literacy, popu-
lation size, agricultural suitability, the number of courier routes and socioeconomic macroregions.
Literacy rates for premodern China are not readily available at the prefecture level; in our matching
analysis we include the number of Ming jinshi (graduates of the metropolitan exam throughout the
Ming dynasty (1368-1644)) as a measure of the human capital stock in a prefecture (see Jiang and
Kung, 2015). Because the number of Ming jinshi also reflects the strength of local gentry, in the
absence of literary inquisitions, prefectures with more Ming jinshi could have experienced di↵er-
ential trends in the formation of local charities. To control for underlying di↵erences in economic
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fundamentals between prefectures, we include estimates of population in 1600 and agricultural suit-
ability. We also include the number of courier routes and ruggedness in our set of pre-treatment
covariates.
To reflect deep-rooted regional di↵erences, we take into account the socioeconomic macroregion
a prefecture belongs to.41 These socioeconomic macroregions were vast areas with their own internal
market systems and urban networks. Each of those regions were of the size of several major Euro-
pean nations. We mainly rely on propensity score matching to fulfill our matching task. However,
we also report results using Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM), which is less model dependent than
propensity score matching (Table A.7).
We show in Table A.5a that in our raw data, our treatment and control groups are unbalanced
on a number of characteristics, including both economic fundamentals and human capital stock.
After matching we obtain a balanced sample as shown in Table A.5c. Reassuringly, the prefectures
in the matched sample are even balanced on characteristics that are not part of the set of the
pretreatment covariates we condition our sample upon (Table A.6), including the initial number of
charities. This suggests that we indeed have a comparable treatment and control group.
C Initial Examination: The Effects on Reputable Individuals
First, we establish that literary inquisitions indeed had an impact on the number of individuals
becoming notable or reputable in a prefecture.42 We look at di↵erent age cohorts of reputable
individuals (aged between 15-30, 31-45 and 46-60). For each decade, there was an average of 2 to
2.5 reputable individuals in each prefecture within each of the above age groups. The cohort of
individuals that were a↵ected the most by literary inquisitions comprised individuals aged between
15-30 during the decade when a prefecture was a↵ected by literary inquisitions. Exposure to literary
inquisitions resulted in a 36% ( 0.36 =  0.903 ÷ 2.476) decline in the number of individuals
becoming reputable (Table A.10). For older cohorts signs are negative, but coe cient estimates are
much smaller and imprecisely estimated. Our interpretation is that older cohorts were less a↵ected
by literary inquisitions. By the time they witnessed or were informed of literary inquisitions, they
would have already produced their influential writings or have done whatever important activities
that led them to becoming well-known.
As reputable individuals are recorded based on their hometown, these results are highly unlikely
to reflect migration away from prefectures after a literary inquisition. Assuming that the size of
local gentry remained relatively stable just before and after the shock, the change in the number
of individual achieving enough to being recorded as a reputable individual is best explained by
individuals going out of their way to avoid publicity and visibility.43
41The socioeconomic macroregions identified by Skinner, Henderson, and Berman (2013) are based on Skinner
(1977). This data is used in Xue (2016). Details on all our variables are provided in Appendix 3.F.
42Note, this is di↵erent from saying that literary inquisitions had an impact on the level of human capital or the
size of local gentry. In fact, we specifically control for the number of jinshi who obtained their degree during that
decade, which is the best time-varying proxy we have for the flow of human capital.
43Details of our specification can be found in Appendix 3.C.3.
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Table 1: The Impact of Literary Inquisitions on Local Charities
# Local Charities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Literary Inquisition -0.750⇤ -0.988⇤⇤ -1.024⇤⇤ -1.024⇤⇤
(0.419) (0.419) (0.506) (0.469)
Initial Pop. Density ⇥ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ming Jinshi ⇥ FE No Yes Yes Yes
Latitude/Longitude ⇥ FE No No Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Macroregion ⇥ FE No No Yes Yes
Decade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering One-Way One-Way One-Way Two-Way
Observations 1417 1417 1417 1417
Adjusted R2 0.779 0.792 0.828 0.828
This table reports di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimates of the e↵ect of literary inquisitions on
the number of local charities. The unit of observation is the prefecture-decade. Column 1
presents our results controlling only for the interaction between decade fixed e↵ects and log
population in 1600. Column 2 controls for the interaction between the number of Ming-
era jinshi and Skinner’s socioeconomic macroregion fixed e↵ects with decade fixed e↵ects.
Column 3 is our baseline specification. It additionally controls for latitude and longitude
interacted with decade fixed e↵ects In Column 4 we repeat the same specification as in
column 3, and cluster our standard errors by both prefecture and decade (Cameron and
Miller, 2015). In all other specifications robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture
level and are reported in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
D Local Charities: Baseline Results
We examine the e↵ects of literary inquisitions on local charities by estimating the following
equation:
Local Charitiesp,d =  Literary Inquisitionp,d + ⌦p +⇤d +X
0
p⇤d + ✏p,d , (1)
where Local Charitiesp,d denotes the number of local charities in Prefecture p, and Decade d.
Literary Inquisitionp,d is an indicator variable that becomes equal to one in the decade d following
the first literary inquisition case in prefecture p. ⌦p is a vector of prefecture fixed e↵ects. ⇤d is a
vector of decade fixed e↵ects.44
A number of prefecture characteristics are possibly correlated with both the chance of being ex-
posed to literary inquisition cases and with the ability of local individuals to build charities. Those
characteristics could have time-varying e↵ects on local charities. In our main specification, we con-
trol for X0p⇤d where Xp includes the number of Ming jinshi, Skinner’s socioeconomic macroregions
and latitude and longitude.
Table A.18, column 1, suggests that after seeing the first literary inquisition case, the number
of local charities in a prefecture fell by about 28% ( 0.28 =  0.75÷ 2.679) relative to the sample
44In Appendix 3D, we show that as an alternative to using the number of local charities as an outcome variable,
we can use the number of charities per capita and obtain very similar results (Table A.19).
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mean. As we add more controls, we arrive at an estimate of a reduction of 1.024 local charities
in a decade, or 38% (0.38 =  1.024 ÷ 2.679) of the sample mean (column 3). From now onwards
we refer to this as the baseline specification. This was a substantial decline in the number of local
charities. As one of the best measures of social capital, this decline in local charities is a telltale
sign of social decay following the literary inquisitions.
Now we ask: how did political repression lead to a decline in charitable activities at a more
micro level? First, because our data source only documents the date of foundation of new charities,
the decline we observe has to be driven by new charities, rather than the closure of existing charities.
Mirroring our results on the trend in reputable individuals, a decline in local charities can be caused
by individuals withdrawing from society. Many literary inquisition cases were associated with
hundreds of arrests. Those who associated with the persecuted individual were often implicated as
well. On the other hand, an individual’s peers were often proximate causes of investigation. They
had the necessary information about an individual to report him to the government. The risk of
persecution greatly increased the costs of social interactions.
These e↵ects could have been cumulative though we cannot test this. To the extent that
charities and other forms of social participation helped to build trust and a community spirit, the
negative impact of persecutions on local organizations could itself have had a further impact on
social capital, leading to more social decay. In Section H, we explore the dynamic e↵ects of literary
inquisitions on local charities.
In interpreting these results, it is important to keep in mind that the policies and laws pertaining
to establishing charities remained unchanged in this period: it remained easy and low cost to
establish local charities (Smith, 1987). Unlike the White Lotus Society and the like, local charities
were never banned or discouraged, and they did not need to go underground.45 In the period after
1600, many parts of China were showing signs of transitioning from a traditional clan-based system
of mutual aid to reliance on more impersonal forms of charity, which involved individuals organizing
to provide help to outsiders. This transition appears to have been impeded or slowed down due
to literary inquisitions. This interpretation is entirely in keeping with our main conclusion that
literary inquisitions led to a decline in civic activity, an emasculation of the public sphere and a
decline in generalized trust.
A decline in the number of local charities may not have been the only change that took place.
The character of local charities could have changed as well.46 Unfortunately, we only have informa-
tion on the name, location, date of foundation, and the original source for each charity. We cannot
estimate the e↵ects of literary inquisitions on the intensive margin of local charities.
As literary inquisitions led to deaths and in a few cases the destruction of property, there may
certainly have been a short-run e↵ect of individual deaths on local society. However, given the total
size of local gentry (roughly 740,000 in 1840 (Chang, 1955)), we do not expect the relatively small
number of deaths caused by literary inquisitions to be large enough to reduce local charities by a
45This was until 1949. The communist regime banned charitable organizations.
46 Liang (2001, p. 169) observes that the founders of charities in the Qing period were less charismatic compared
to their predecessors in the Ming period.
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third of its mean for the next hundred of years.47 In other words, the persistent decline in local
charities cannot be explained by the killing of local gentry.
To ensure that we are identifying the e↵ects of literary inquisitions on social capital, in the
the remainder of this section, we consider factors which might have been possible determinants of
inquisition cases and also correlated with the number of local charities. These include prefecture
characteristics which might have prompted the Qing government to be more likely to persecute
individuals from these regions. We also control for initial levels of social capital, economic develop-
ment and urbanization and for time-varying factors such as natural disasters that may a↵ected the
demand for local charities.
E Local Charities: Initial Conditions
The historical evidence we have reviewed suggests that cases were highly idiosyncratic and
had to be processed through a complicated bureaucratic system. Thus it was largely coincidental
whether a case would reach the imperial court in the end. In constructing our main sample,
we already matched our treatment and control groups on factors such as average literacy in the
prefecture, as proxied for by the number of examination candidates during the Ming period, as
a first step to mitigate di↵erential trends in the formation of local charities arising from di↵erent
prefecture characteristics. In Table A.12, we take a closer look at political economy factors. The
reasoning is that these could have simultaneously a↵ected the chance of literary inquisitions and
produced di↵erential trends in the formation of local charities.
E.1 The Political Economy of Literary Inquisitions
Han opposition to Manchu rule. The literary inquisitions were rooted in tensions between Qing
rulers and the Han Chinese population. Such tensions were particularly acute during the Ming-
Qing transition. In contrast, the peak of the literary inquisitions was more than 100 years after the
Qing takeover, and those cases did not reflect actual anti-Manchu activities unlike earlier events.
Nevertheless, these earlier events could still reveal valuable information about the characteristics of
a particular location.
We first look at conflicts that took place between 1644 and 1690—before Qing acquired control
over entire China proper and after the collapse of Ming. We then look at the individuals who refused
to work for the Qing government—Ming loyalists who had a strong ideological commitment to the
Ming dynasty.
We use the number of conflicts between 1644 and 1690 as a summary measure of opposition to
Qing rule—more conflicts reflected more intense opposition. If areas which showed more opposition
to Qing rule had di↵erential trends in the formation of local charities, our estimates would be biased.
We address this concern by including the number of the conflicts between 1644 and 1690 interacted
with decade fixed e↵ects (column 1). Our estimates remain una↵ected.48
47After the first literary inquisition case, Literary Inquisitionp,d becomes equal to one, each prefecture lost one to
several hundreds of individuals. Some of those would be part of the local gentry.
48These results are robust to an alternative classification of Ming-Qing battles that focuses on the period between
1634-1649.
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Ming loyalists were those who worked for the Ming government, but refused to serve the Qing
government after 1644. Notable opponents of the Qing, like Qu Dajun, devoted themselves to
various Ming loyalist movements. In several literary inquisition cases, individuals were in trouble
for possessing books written by one of those Ming loyalists. In many other cases, nostalgia towards
the Ming Dynasty was an important trigger that could anger the emperor, and was often su cient
grounds for an individual to be charged with “treason”.
We coded our data on Ming loyalists from Sun (1985). This allows us to construct a measure
of the number of Ming loyalists at a prefecture level which serves as a second proxy for disapproval
of Qing rule. If such a sentiment was reflected in speech and writings, it would increase the
probability of literary inquisitions in that prefecture.49 Column 2 suggests that adding loyalty to
the Ming dynasty to the regression does not a↵ect the estimated e↵ect of literary inquisitions on
local charities.
Independent Academies and Anti-Authoritarianism. We also consider the significance of the
independent academies that emerged during the Ming period. In the late Ming period, intellectuals
formed academies in order to discuss ideas and to influence policymaking (Peterson, 2002, p. 479).
Historians describe these as part of a vibrant proto-liberal and “anti-authoritarian” intellectual
culture that arose and helped form a nascent public sphere in late Ming China (Rankin, 1990;
Wakeman, 1998; Hung, 2011).
One of the first policies the Qing regime implemented was to abolish those academies. Never-
theless, the anti-authoritarian intellectual traditions pursued by those Ming-era academies remained
influential into the Qing period and were deemed as a threat to Qing rule. This could influence the
probability of literary inquisitions on the margin. Moreover, if Ming-era academies were the product
of deep-rooted political preferences held by individuals in those prefectures, or alternatively, if the
social interactions and discussions in those academies helped to produce political preferences that
led to di↵erential trends in the formation of local charities, this could lead to biased estimates. To
address this, we include an interaction term between the number of Ming-era academies and decade
fixed e↵ects. The estimated e↵ect of literary inquisitions remains stable (column 3).
E.2 Initial social capital.
In our matched sample prefectures with literary inquisitions and those without had roughly the
same number of local charities in 1700 (Table A.5). All else equal, this should reduce the possibility
that those prefectures would have experienced di↵erential trends in the formation of local charities
even in the absence of literary inquisitions. As data on local charities in 1700 may not be of the best
quality, in Table 2, we control for proxies, or important determinants, of social capital, interacted
with decade fixed e↵ects (Panel A). Note that region-level trends in the formation of local charities,
are already accounted for in the baseline regressions by the inclusion of socioeconomic regions
interacted with decade fixed e↵ects.
49Having more Ming loyalists was also linked to greater solidarity among intellectuals. In the early decades of
Qing rule, it was not unusual for intellectuals to sanction those who “betrayed” the movement to collaborate with
Qing. Solidarity among intellectuals in the 1600s could be a characteristic that was positively correlated with the
prevalence of local charities—both in 1600s and later on—but its e↵ect could vary over time.
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In columns 1 to 5, we control for local charities in 1700, Buddhist temples in 1700, funding
agencies in 1700, linguistic fragmentation index, and the first principle component of the first four
variables, interacted with decade fixed e↵ects. Martinez-Bravo, Padro-i-Miquel, Qian, Xu, and Yao
(2017) show that Buddhist temples are a proxy for social capital in modern China. Funding agencies
were local organizations that accepted donations to support the travel of examination candidate
to capital cities. The linguistic fragmentation index is the same as in Bai and Jia (2016). Our
coe cients of interest remain relatively stable across all columns.50
E.3 Economic and State Development
Commerce and economic prosperity can lead to institutional change. One common mechanism is
that trade empowers local economic elites who then press for more inclusive institutions (Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson, 2005; Angelucci, Meraglia, and Voigtla¨nder, 2017). It is also possible that
such elites might come into conflict with the ruler—as took place frequently in European history.
Although there was no strict equivalent in the case of China, commerce and economic prosperity
was also a non-negligible factors in the political landscape. Richer areas, with more commercial
activities, were a breeding ground for an anti-authoritarianism tradition, and managed to develop
impersonal charities earlier and in larger numbers. As established in Section IV.E.1, the former
factor made it possible that these regions might have attracted the attention of Qing ruler, a↵ecting
the probability of a literary inquisition case ending up in the imperial court on the margin.
In Table 2, Panel B, we interact local economic factors with decade fixed e↵ects. First we
include the interaction between agricultural suitability and decade fixed e↵ects (column 6). Next
we consider urbanization. Satyanath, Voigtla¨nder, and Voth (2017) find that urbanization predicts
association density in Weimar Germany. The first charities in China emerged in the late Ming
period in urban areas to help the urban poor. We use various estimates of total urban population
from 1393—the only available year for which estimates of the urban population exist—for this
purpose (column 7). To account for the degree of commercialization, we use distance to either the
Grand Canal or the Yangtze (column 8) and distance to the coast (column 9). Finally, in column
10, we control for a prefecture’s proximity to the nearest imperial courier route. Imperial courier
routes were used by the state to deliver palace memorials or manuscripts. We expect to capture
state presence with this variable. Overall, our estimates do not vary greatly across columns.
F The Demand for Charities.
There were several factors shaping the demand for charities. Natural disasters tended to increase
the demand for charities as “the need for aid was thus defined by the emergency” (Smith, 1987,
p. 310). If natural disasters increased the probability of literary inquisitions, we would underestimate
the e↵ect of persecutions on local charities. The same logic applies to conflicts. There is also the
possibility that literary inquisitions could have incited conflicts due to being perceived as “unjust”.
So first, in Table A.13, we show that literary inquisitions were not a response to natural disasters or
50We re-estimate our main specification with funding agencies as an alternative outcome and find quite similar
results. Literary inquisitions have a negative e↵ect on the formation of funding agencies, but the coe cient is just
below the threshold for statistical significance.
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Table 2: The Impact of Literary Inquisitions on Local Charities: Initial Social Capital and Economic Conditions
Panel A: Initial Social Capital
# Local Charities
Initial Buddhist Funding Fragmentation 1st Principle
Charities Temples Agencies Index Component
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Literary Inquisition -0.927⇤ -1.056⇤⇤ -1.024⇤⇤ -1.034⇤⇤ -0.892⇤
(0.494) (0.523) (0.510) (0.491) (0.493)
Baseline Controls ⇥ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1417 1417 1417 1404 1404
Adjusted R2 0.841 0.827 0.826 0.829 0.833
Panel B: Economic Development and State Capacity
# Local Charities
Ag. Suitability Urbanization Yangtze/Grand Canal Coast Courier Routes
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Literary Inquisition -0.999⇤ -1.663⇤⇤ -0.993⇤⇤ -1.120⇤⇤ -1.022⇤⇤
(0.508) (0.637) (0.475) (0.519) (0.505)
Baseline Controls ⇥ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1417 1417 1417 1417 1417
This table reports di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimates of the e↵ect of literary inquisitions on the number of local charities
controlling for initial social capital and initial economic conditions interacted with decade fixed e↵ects. Baseline
controls include Ming-era jinshi, log population in 1600, latitude and longitude, and socioeconomic macroregion fixed
e↵ects. In all columns we use the same controls as in column 3 of Table A.18. Columns 1 to 5 control for the
interaction between decade fixed e↵ects and the initial number of local charities, Buddhist temples, the number of
funding agencies to support examination candidates, ethnolinguistic fragmentation and the 1st principal component
of all the above measures of social capital. Columns 6 to 10, control for interaction between decade fixed e↵ects and
agricultural suitability, urbanization during the Ming Dynasty, whether a prefecture is located on the Yangtze River
or the Grand Canal, whether a prefecture is located on the coast, and whether a prefecture had a courier route. In all
specifications robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level and are reported in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.10,
⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
conflicts (Panel A); nor did conflicts break out in the aftermath of literary inquisitions (Panel B).
Next, we explicitly control for the intensity of natural disasters and the number of conflicts during
each decade (Table A.17, columns 1–2).
In addition, we consider the “supply” side of charities. Similar to Section IV.C, we rely on the
number of newly-minted jinshi during that decade to capture a change in human capital. (Table
A.17, column 3). For our purpose, it is important to know whether there was a change in the
extensive margin of the pool of individuals who were capable enough to organize and donate to
charities. Although jinshi were only a small subset of such individuals, it is the best time-varying
measure that we can find for such a purpose.
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G Additional Robustness Checks
First, we confirm that our results are not driven by prefectures with particularly large or small
numbers of gentry. The e↵ects are present for prefectures with both above and below the median
number of examination candidates and quotas for the examination system (Table A.20).
Second, we consider the impact of government spending. If the imperial authorities discrimi-
nated against a↵ected prefectures after a literary inquisition case broke out, they could decide to
how many resources to be allocated to those prefectures. Disaster relief and tax relief were one
of the major government expenditures in Qing China. Controlling for a time-varying measure of
disaster relief or tax relief does not change our results (Table A.21).
Third we look at an alternative outcome variable: government sponsored academies. We do not
expect to see any impact of literary inquisitions on government sponsored academies and indeed
find no such e↵ect (Table A.23).
Fourth, we then address concerns about spatial spillovers and contagion. As all decisions
concerning literary inquisitions were carried out within a centralized bureaucracy, there was no
mechanism for cases to be geographically clustered, or to spread from one prefecture to the next.
Moreover, although a specific case could make the emperor more suspicious and paranoid and
perhaps more likely to punish individuals involved in future cases, it was far more common to see
cases being correlated in time, rather than in space.51 As a robustness check, we correct for spatial
autocorrelation and find little evidence for spatial spillovers (Table A.18).
Finally, we conduct a range of other robustness checks in Appendix 3.D. Our results are un-
changed when we: (a) use di↵erent time periods and vary the starting date and ending date of
our analysis (Table A.14, columns 1-4); (b) drop prefectures which had no charities by 1750 (Table
A.14, column 5); (c) drop prefectures which had no charities by 1830 (Table A.14, column 6); drop
prefectures which had no Ming jinshi (column 7); (d) omit prefectures which are reported as having
a large number of immigrants (Table A.14, column 8); and (e) use 50-year time periods (Table
A.22).52
H Dynamic Effects
Using a fully flexible model, we trace out the full dynamic response of local charities to literary
inquisitions. Figure A.6 plots the coe cients from this regression confirming that literary inquisi-
tions had a long-lasting impact on local charities, keeping the number of local charities persistently
low in every single decade following the persecution.53
51For example, the year 1761 saw five inquisition cases but these a↵ected very disparate parts of the country. The
distance between the first case and the second case was 824 km. 460 and 352 km respectively separated the second
and third, and third and fourth cases that occurred that year, while the final case took place 1542 km away from
the fourth case.
52We do this to avoid concerns about serial autocorrelation as it reduces time-series variation. In our main analysis,
we focus on the periods prior to and shortly after an inquisition. A relatively small number of periods minimize the
chances of false rejections in di↵erences-in-di↵erences setup (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004).
53After 1840, local charities flourished in part due to Western influence, but this growth was highly variable. In
some regions the growth of charities was relatively stagnant in comparison to other regions. Our results suggest that
a legacy of literary inquisitions can explain part of this variation.
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Such a pattern suggests that prefectures a↵ected by literary inquisitions, after a few decades of
adjustment and adaption, eventually settled into a new equilibrium in which fewer local charities
existed. This pattern lends support to our social capital hypothesis: social capital was gradually
eroded until it reached a lower steady state, as reflected in fewer charities.
Due to the critical function played by local charities, and the lack of capacity for the premodern
state to invest in the provision of social services or insurance, a decline in local charities could
lead to a governance vacuum. Coupled with a possible decline in other local organizations, such as
examination funding agencies, prefectures a↵ected by literary inquisitions may also have experienced
the under provision of public goods.
The contemporaneous e↵ects of such under provision of public goods make it di cult to say
if social capital was the main transmission mechanism underlying the persistent e↵ects of liter-
ary inquisitions. To shed further light on this, in the next section, we examine the e↵ects of
literary inquisitions in several new contexts: generalized trust, the informal/decentralized vs. for-
mal/centralized provision of public goods, political participation and political views. By introducing
several new sources of variation, we hope to distinguish the social capital hypothesis from competing
explanations for the persistent decline in local charities in Qing China.
V The Effects of Political Repression on Social Capital Today
The first part of our analysis suggests that the persecutions of the Qing period had an immediate
impact on charity formation that last throughout the Qing Dynasty. To narrow down possible
interpretations of our results, we consider the e↵ects of the Qing persecutions after the collapse of
the empire and in a di↵erent political and institutional setting. We first document the negative
correlation between the Qing persecutions and generalized trust in modern China. Then we examine
the impact of the Qing persecutions on the formal and informal provision of basic education in
centralized and decentralized systems. Figure 3 provides a timeline illustrating the key cuto↵
points in our analysis. Throughout, we employ the same sample as used in the historical panel.
This means we continue to have a sample of prefectures balanced on pre-1700 characteristics for
our analysis of modern China.
A Generalized Trust
We first use the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) to demonstrate some intriguing cor-
relations between literary inquisitions and modern culture. We focus on generalized trust, the
most widely used measure of social capital. As individual level controls, we include fixed e↵ects
for gender, age, and the level of education. Contemporary controls include log per capita income
and the proportion of the population belonging to ethnic minorities, the percentage urban and the
percentage enrolled in primary education. We also control for linguistic fragmentation.
According to Table 3, the Qing persecutions reduced generalized trust. The magnitude of
this e↵ect is economically meaningful: a history of political repression is associated with a 1/6th
of standard deviation reduction (0.167 = 0.179 ÷ 1.07) in trust (column 3).54 Our coe cient
54These results are robust to controlling for the number of death during the Cultural Revolution.
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Figure 3: A timeline of the literary inquisitions and key events
estimates of interest remain stable when we include individual characteristics such as age, gender,
and education (column 2), and control for contemporary factors that the literature has shown to be
correlated with trust (Alesina and Ferrara, 2002; Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso, 2014) (column 3).
We do not expect the Qing persecutions to a↵ect trust between family members. Compared
to generalized trust, trust within the family is a form of particularized trust, with little connection
to the public sphere or civic activity. Literary inquisitions mainly increased the risk of dealing
with outsiders. The Qing state encouraged individuals to denounce their peers or superiors to the
authorities, but unlike modern totalitarian states, individuals were not expected to denounce family
members (who were, in any case, punished collectively with the perpetrator).55 Columns 4–6 of
Table 3 confirm that there is no e↵ect on trust within families.
This is a striking result. In modern China, the state has taken over most of the functions of local
organizations. Self-governing local charities no longer exist. The di↵erences in generalized trust
clearly do not rely on the continued presence of local charities.56 This increases our confidence that
reduced social capital was (i) a consequence of literary inquisitions and (ii) is the main explanation
for the persistent e↵ects of literary inquisitions.
B The Provision of Public Goods
We have demonstrated that a correlation consists between the Qing persecutions and generalized
trust in the 21st century. Logically speaking, if we can find an e↵ect of the Qing persecutions today,
we should be able to find evidence of persistence in the 20th century. China in the 20th century
went through radical political and economic changes, providing rich variation in the institutional
constraints faced by basic education. We examine the di↵erential impact of the Qing persecutions
on the provision of basic education, depending on the institutional constraints. Had social capital
decreased as a consequence of literary inquisitions, we should see an e↵ect of literary inquisitions on
basic education when and where social capital was a determinant of the provision of basic education.
Education in all premodern societies tended to be decentralized and informal. In imperial
55Collective punishment of family members was a long-standing tradition in imperial Chinese laws, arising from
a conflict between the requirement of being loyal to the state and filial piety.
56 After 1949, the state instituted stringent rules against the formation of local organizations. In the meantime,
the state gained substantial capacity and superseded most of the functions of the remaining local organizations.
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Table 3: Long-Run Analysis: Literary Inquisitions and Generalized Trust (CGSS)
Generalized Trust Trust in Family
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of Dep. Var 3.477 3.477 3.486 4.798 4.798 4.796
Literary Inquisition -0.187⇤⇤ -0.158⇤ -0.179⇤ 0.0397 0.0340 -0.000251
(0.0845) (0.0921) (0.0915) (0.0460) (0.0438) (0.0383)
Individual Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Contemporary Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Socioeconomic Macroregion FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 3346 3343 3246 3345 3341 3244
Adjusted R2 0.00354 0.0293 0.0481 0.000581 -0.000423 0.0152
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between literary inquisitions and trust in
modern China. The dependent variables are on a 1-5 scale. Columns 1–3 examine the relationship
between literary inquisitions and generalized trust. Columns 4–6 show that there is no relationship
between literary inquisitions and trust within the family. Individual controls include fixed e↵ects for
gender, age, and the level of education. Apart from the linguistic fragmentation index, contemporary
controls are the same as in Table 6, including log GDP per capita, log population in 2010, years of
schooling, share of urban population and share of agricultural workforce. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the prefecture level and are reported in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.01.
China, the state did not actively govern at a local level and provided very few public goods.57
Basic education were the responsibility of clans and to a less extent, of local gentry.58 Starting
from the 1900s, the provision of basic education gradually shifted from a clan-based to a village-
based system. The system remained highly informal. Not until the 1930s, under the Nationalist
government, did the primary schooling system finally take o↵, and become much more centralized.
This centralization continued through the Communist period until the Cultural Revolution, which
saw the disruption of central direction and the devolution of education funding.
B.1 Basic Education in Early 20th Century China: OLS Estimates
We start by taking a snapshot of the provision of basic education in early 20th century China.
This is the period that we expect social capital to make a di↵erence for educational outcomes through
a↵ecting the informal provision of basic education.59 We reconstruct the cohort of individuals who
57See Feuerwerker (1980), Kuhn (2002), Sng (2014), and Vries (2015).
58In particular, local gentry played a key role in the provision of basic education. The same individuals who were
responsible for the organizing the provision of local charities in the Qing period also played a vital role in schooling.
Basic education was the responsibility of either families or locally provided schools run on a voluntary basis by local
gentry. Teaching was an “honorable profession for the gentry” and many “took the attitude that when they were
accepted by the government, they should step into o cialdom, and that if they were not in government service, they
should be engaged in teaching” (Chang, 1962).
59The consequences of lower social capital should manifest themselves most strongly when institutions are informal
and decentralized (see Ostrom, 2000). Knack and Keefer (1997) similarly note that social capital produces higher
levels of cooperation and that this enables individuals to overcome the local collective action problems that typically
besets the provision of public goods. Such collective action problems are a particularly acute in societies with low
state capacity, where states are unable to provide basic public goods or where ethnolinguistic fractionalization is high
(Alesina and Ferrara, 2000). In line with this prediction, Hollard and Sene (2016) show that in sub-Saharan Africa
social capital improves the provision of health care.
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were educated during that period from the 1982 census. These were individuals who were at least 70
in 1982 (i.e. born before 1912). The assumption is that based on the years in which those individuals
were born, they were most likely educated in the decentralized primary schooling system.
We estimate the e↵ect of literary inquisitions on the provision of basic education in the early
20th century using the following equation:
Literatep,i = ↵ +  LiteraryInquisitionp + ⌦Xp +⇥Xi +  prov + m + ✏p,i . (2)
The dependent variable Literatep,i is a dummy variable that is equal to one if an individual was
literate when surveyed in 1982. We control for prefecture-level variables Xp that are known to be
determinants of literacy or of social capital in the literature. 60 The vector Xi contains individual
level characteristics such as gender, household size, and marital status.  prov and  m are province
fixed e↵ects and socioeconomic macroregion fixed e↵ects.
Xp includes historical and geographical factors such as agricultural suitability, population den-
sity in 1820, per capita taxation in 1820, distance to Beijing, distance to the nearest courier route,
whether a prefecture was on the Grand Canal or Yangtze river, on the coast, or was an important
center of transport and communication (Chong), and business (Fan), di cult to tax (Pi) or a↵ected
by high crime (Nan), whether a prefecture was a treaty port and ruggedness. Most of those co-
variates are standard controls that take into account economic and political conditions. Variables
such as per capita taxation in 1820, distance to Beijing and distance to the nearest courier route
are included to account for the impact of the state.
In Xp, we also include two measures of historical human capital: the density of jinshi degree
holders and per capita quota for shengyuan degrees. The second measure also captures variation in
the institutions responsible for producing human capital as the quota was stipulated by the state.
In our preferred specification (column 4), we also include population size in 1982, the percentage of
population older than 65 in 1982, and the percentage of the population who are Manchu.61
Table 4 reports the e↵ects of literary inquisitions on literacy in the early 20th century. According
to our preferred specification, in a prefecture with a legacy of literary inquisitions, the probability
of individuals being literate decreases by 5.2 percentage points (column 4).62 The magnitude of this
e↵ect is relatively large: on average only 15% of individual aged 70 or above in 1982 were literate.
It is worth mentioning that this is comparable in size to the e↵ect we find in the historical panel:
approximately a third of the mean of the dependent variable. In column 2, we restrict our sample
to 80 year olds only. The magnitude of the e↵ect is again close to a third of the mean (0.26 =
0.0283 ÷0.108).
We do not find a statistically significant e↵ect of literary inquisitions on middle or high school
education among 70 year olds (Table A.25). The long-run e↵ect of literary inquisitions appears to
60We describe the process involved in matching di↵erent datasets in detail in Appendix 3.C.2.
61In all specifications we use the same sample as in our prefecture level DID and, as in those estimations, we
employ a caliper size of 0.002.
62In Table A.24 we show that these results are also robust to controlling for conditions prior to the literary
inquisitions, such as the number of Ming jinshi, Ming-era academies, and Ming loyalists.
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Table 4: Basic Education in the Early 20th Century: Main Specification
Literate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.153 0.108 0.153 0.153
Literary Inquisition -0.0447⇤⇤ -0.0283⇤ -0.0453⇤⇤ -0.0524⇤⇤
(0.0205) (0.0166) (0.0206) (0.0220)
Log Jinshi Density 0.0136 0.00559 0.0266 0.0336⇤⇤
(0.0153) (0.0104) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Over 80 Year Olds Only No Yes No No
Individual Controls No No Yes Yes
Contemporary Controls No No No Yes
Historical and Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72658 12035 72658 72658
Adjusted R2 0.0340 0.0244 0.233 0.233
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between literary inquisitions and literacy in the early
20th century. The dependent variable is whether an individual is literate. All individuals were over 70
when surveyed in 1982. All specifications include province fixed e↵ects and socioeconomic macroregion
fixed e↵ects. Individual controls include gender, marital status, and the number of couples in the house-
hold. Contemporary controls include log population, % aged over 65, and % Manchu. Historical and
geographical controls include examination (shengyuang) quota in 1820, per capita taxation in 1820, agri-
cultural suitability, population density in 1820, per capita taxation in 1820, distance to Beijing, distance
to the nearest courier route, whether a prefecture was on the Grand Canal or Yangtze river, on the coast,
or was an important center of transport and communication (Chong), and business (Fan), di cult to tax
(Pi) or a↵ected by high crime (Nan), whether a prefecture was a treaty port and ruggedness. Column 1
just includes our historical and geographical controls. Column 2 focuses only on individuals aged 80 or
greater in 1982. Column 3 adds individual level controls. Column 4 is our preferred specification (and
baseline) which includes all sets of controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the prefecture level, are
reported in parentheses. There are 72 clusters. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
be concentrated among the least educated. This null result highlights the social capital channel—
given that middle and high schools were often directly funded by provincial governments, there
was no obvious way for middle and high school education to be a↵ected by a lack of social capital.
This is consistent with our understanding that literary inquisitions a↵ected the mentalities of the
local gentry, their trust in each other and their participation in public a↵airs, but did not a↵ect all
aspects of society indiscriminately.
We acknowledge the possibility that 70 year olds surveyed in 1982 could have become literate
after 1930s as adults. Compared with the younger generations, however, their opportunities to do
so were slim. By the time of the anti-illiteracy campaigns of the 1950s, they were already in their
40s and 50s and they would have been extremely unlikely to have opportunities to acquire literary
earlier (see Peterson, 1994). For our estimates to be biased, though, the probability for individuals
to be re-educated at a later age has to be correlated with the Qing persecutions.
It is possible that literate and illiterate individuals were not equally represented in the census,
i.e. due to di↵erential survival rates. If the rich are more likely to live longer and to be literate
and if regions which had greater numbers of richer and more educated individuals were more likely
to experience literary inquisitions, then our estimates might be biased. To address this, we control
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for the age structure of a prefecture’s population. In addition, since di↵erential survival probability
is likely greater for the older cohort, we show in Section D that the same results hold for a much
younger cohort similarly educated under a decentralized schooling system.
C Basic Education in Early 20th Century China: Political and Demographic
Shocks
China experienced tremendous political turmoil from the middle of the 19th century to the
Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. One might suspect that some of those events were the actual
forces behind low literacy rates, and just happened to be correlated with the incidence of literary
inquisitions. We check our results against three major historical events: the Taiping Rebellion, the
exodus to Taiwan in 1949, and the Cultural Revolution.
First, we account for the Taiping Rebellion which struck China between 1850 and 1864. The
Taiping Rebellion was a major shock to the population, a↵ecting the local gentry, and local social
capital. If prefectures exposed to the Taiping Rebellion also had literary inquisitions, we might be
picking up the e↵ects of the Taiping Rebellion instead.
The impact of the Taiping rebellion was twofold: on the one hand, the Taiping rebellion was
associated with tremendous destruction—modern estimates suggest that the conflict caused the
population to fall by as much as 20 million (Platt, 2012). On the other hand, areas that were
a↵ected by the Taiping rebellion saw greater local autonomy in subsequent decades as the Qing
responded to the rebellion by empowering local intellectuals and gentry to raise taxes and armies
to fight the rebels (see Kuhn, 1979).
Based on Table A.22, the gap in the number of local charities between a↵ected and una↵ected
prefectures continued through the Taiping Rebellion. Here we explicitly control for exposure to
the Taiping Rebellion. Table A.28 summarizes our estimates controlling for whether or how long
a prefecture was occupied by the Taiping troops. In column 3, we see a negative and statistically
significant e↵ect of logged months occupied by Taiping troops, possibly suggesting that the negative
e↵ects of the large-scale destruction outweighed the benefits of more local autonomy after the
Taiping Rebellion. However, the estimated e↵ect of a literary inquisition does not change at all,
suggesting that the e↵ect of the Taiping Rebellion is more or less independent of that of the literary
inquisitions.
Second, we investigate the e↵ects of the exodus to Taiwan in 1949. During the transition to the
Communist regime, about two million individuals left for Taiwan. The average migrant to Taiwan
was more educated than the average individual in his cohort. If the decision to flee to Taiwan in
1949 was correlated with the Qing persecutions, we would risk overestimating the negative e↵ect of
Qing persecutions.
We collect new data to provide an estimate of the percentage of the population who migrated
to Taiwan in 1949.63 We construct our measures of out-migration from genealogy records available
at the Taiwan Family Genealogy Catalogue Database (TFGCD). The TFGCD is a database that
63Taiwan was the main destination for migrants. We focus on Taiwan in this paper, but there were certainly other
destinations for out-migration.
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aggregates information from a range of sources, the most important of which is the Taiwan special
collection maintained by the Genealogical Society of Utah (GSU). We determine the prefecture
of origin of the clans featured in those genealogical records, and construct a crude measure of
out-migration at a prefecture level. In Appendix 3.E.4, we provide a detailed description of our
approach, including the procedures taken to construct those variables and the associated caveats
concerning their use. Table A.29 shows that our baseline results are not a↵ected regardless of the
measures we use.
Finally, we look into another major historical shock: the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The
Cultural Revolution was an extremely violent period. Victims of the Cultural Revolution were
more likely to have been relatively well-to-do (the landed class, the educated etc. . . . ) in previous
regimes. Given that the educated died at a higher rate than the uneducated during the Cultural
Revolution, if literary inquisitions are correlated with unobserved prefecture characteristics that
predict more Cultural Revolution deaths, we would overestimate the negative e↵ect of the Qing
persecutions. Using data on the number of victims from Walder (2014), we examine the e↵ects of
the Cultural Revolution in Table A.30. In all columns except for column 6, we get the expected
signs for the e↵ects of the Cultural Revolution, but this has no impact on the estimated e↵ect of
the Qing persecutions. Hence our results are not confounded by the large-scale violence that took
place during the Cultural Revolution. Details of variable construction are provided in Appendix
3.D64
C.1 Basic Education in Early 20th Century China: IV Estimates
We have accounted for the impact of major historical shocks and shown that none of them has
a material impact on our estimates. Nevertheless, literary inquisitions might still be correlated with
unobserved characteristics of the prefecture which would introduce omitted variable bias. While
for our historical panel analysis we are able to exploit variation in the timing of an inquisition
for identification, such variation is not available in a cross-sectional analysis. Instead, we rely on
instrumental variables for sources of plausibly exogenous variation in literary inquisitions to aid our
estimation.
One source of variation in the probability of a prefecture experiencing literary inquisitions was
the amount of knowledge Manchu rulers had of their subject population, the Han Chinese. As
explained earlier, many literary inquisition cases were replete with misunderstandings and misap-
prehensions. The emperor did not have su cient information to judge a case, but he was the
one with the final say. The error band around his decision making was substantial. When a case
originated from a place that the emperor found relatively alien, this information problem was exac-
erbated. Given that the emperor’s primary concern was instilling obedience and deterring potential
opposition, and had no reason to care about false positives (see the model in Section 2), this could
easily lead to more persecutions taking place: “just to be on the safe side”. Due to their history, peo-
ple from some parts of China had more interactions with the Manchus prior to the Qing conquest.
64Based on column 1, a one-standard-deviation increase in the number of deaths per capita is associated with a
reduction of literary rates by 2 percentage points.
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Where there was a greater history of such interaction, the Manchus would have had slightly more
knowledge about the local Han population, and in addition, less distrust and antipathy towards
them.65
Distance to Shenyang provides an exogenous variation in the level of interaction between Han
Chinese and Manchus prior to the Qing conquest. Shenyang (Mukden) was an important ancestral
homeland of Manchus. Upon the formation of the Manchu state in the early 1600s, Shenyang
became the Manchu capital until Manchus invaded China in 1644. A nice feature of this instrument
is that throughout its history, Shenyang was never an important economic or political center for
China proper, the area of focus in this paper. Besides, as soon as Manchus took control over China
proper, they ceased to use Shenyang as their capital city, further diminishing its economic and
political relevance. Given a lack of relevance of Shenyang to prefectures in China proper, it is
highly unlikely for social capital in those prefectures to be systematically correlated with distance
to Shenyang. This helps our instrument to satisfy the exclusion restriction.66
Another factor that could shift the probability of literary inquisitions on the margin, was the
availability of the means of the Qing state had to crack down on conflicts, had revolts and uprisings
taken place as a result of anti-manchu ideas that went unpunished. We collect data on the locations
of army bases sta↵ed by Eight Banners in Qing China. There were 31 such bases in Qing China.
The Eight Banners were the most loyal and capable forces available to the emperor and the units
trusted to subdue unrest. They were predominantly Manchus.67
The rationale behind the instrument is that prefectures within a few days’ march of the Eight
Banners were easier to control and less of a threat than those located farther away from the nearest
Eight Banner forces. Hence, all else equal, the emperor would have been more comfortable “toler-
ating” incidents that he had little information of and which were ambiguous in nature (which was
almost all of them) and would have seen less need to send out a costly signal about his power in the
first place. Below we demonstrate how our instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction and why
distance to the nearest Eight Banner base is unlikely to a↵ect modern social capital through other
channels.
The Eight Banners were widely dispersed around the empire for both external defense and to
maintain internal order. The median distance of a prefecture’s to the nearest Eight Banner army
base in our data is 150km. The maximum distance is 400 km. If the units involved were mounted
65Likewise, Han Chinese from parts of China with little interactions with the Manchus prior to the Qing Conquest,
also had less distrust and antipathy to the Qing rule. In Shandong, for example, Chinese displayed markedly di↵erent
attitudes towards the Manchus. The two peoples had a history of cultural and economic interactions in the period
before the Qing conquest (Wakeman, 1985), including a history of sea-borne trade with one another.
66Shenyang did remained of cultural significance to the Manchu rulers of China after 1644.The Qianlong emperor
even commissioned an “Ode to Mukden’.’
67The Eight Banners were the most e↵ective component of the Qing army and was trusted and relied upon by
the Qing emperors. According to Kuhn (1979, p. 10): “The Eight Banners could of course be expected to render
the most undeviating loyalty to the throne; descendants of the original Manchu conquerors and their Chinese allies,
they had been brought under the close political control of the royal family”. There was also the Green Standard
Army, made up of Han Chinese ,which was much larger but poorly trained and not trusted to deal with unrest or
rebellions.
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and not larger than a few hundred men, they would be easily able to cover 150km in between 2 and
3 days but it could take them more than a week to reach a location 400 km away.68
In an ideal world the Eight Banners would have been located to best counter threats to the
regime and in equilibrium the threat of rebellion would be equalized across regions. In reality, the
locations of the Eight Banners were sharply constrained by several political and geographic factors
that were not present in previous regimes, as evidenced by the locations of the Eight Banners in
the Qing period being very di↵erent to those of imperial army in prior dynasties. In particular,
the number of bannermen was small and, as they were predominantly cavalry, they needed to be
stationed near forage that was key to maintaining their horses and hence their e↵ectiveness as a
fighting force. For that reason, the expected damage caused by rebellions was uneven across regions.
From the perspective of the emperor, the Eight Banners were an important means of political
control. In the event of an uprising, the Eight Banners would by directed to suppress it immediately.
But they were not an integral part of the state per se. Thus this is not a measure of state capacity.
Bannermen were isolated from Han Chinese. From around 1000 AD onwards, China was ruled by
a centralized civilian bureaucracy. The Eight Banners had their own laws and did not govern Han
Chinese (Elliott, 2001). This reduces the chances of there being additional e↵ects from proximity
to Eight Banners bases, further ensuring that our instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction.
Table 5 reports our results using (a.) distance to Shenyang (columns 1–2) (b.) distance to
the nearest Eight Banner base (columns 3–5), and (c.) both (columns 6–8). In the first stage,
distance to Shenyang increases the probability of literary inquisitions. Similarly, distance to the
Eight Banners increases the chance of literary inquisitions. First stage results show that both
instruments are relevant. The F-statistic is reasonably high so we do not have weak instruments.
Panel A summarizes the second stage estimates. In columns 1–2, we report results using distance
to Shenyang as an instrument. In columns 3–5, we employ distance to the nearest Eight Banner
base. In column 5 we control for distance to the nearest Ming army base, so if there was something
special about being near an army base, such as more order and security, it would be accounted
for. In columns 6–8 we include both instruments and test the overidentifying restrictions. Across
specifications we find a strong and very consistent negative e↵ect of the Qing persecutions on
literacy. The magnitude of these coe cients are slightly larger than those we obtain using OLS,
but are still comparable. Moreover, our instruments pass the overidentification test (columns 6–
8): the p-values (0.81, 0.82 and 0.92) for the Hansen J-statistics do not reject the null that both
instruments are valid.69
In Table A.31, we use the distance to the nearest courier route as a placebo instrument. Distance
to a courier route is one measure of state capacity.70 First stage results suggest that distance to the
nearest courier route does not predict literary inquisitions. This helps to ease concern that state
68For discussions of the speed of movement of premodern military forces we are indebted to a discussion with
Andrea Matranga. For a detailed discussion of how fast premodern armies could move see Engels (1978).
69The joint null hypothesis is that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded and estimating equation is
correctly specified. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then at least one instrument is not valid.
70This is a similar idea to Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015) and has been used in Xue (2016).
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capacity is driving our results in Table 5.
D From Decentralization to Centralization
We have shown that the Qing persecutions reduced the provision of basic education, when the
schooling system was informal and decentralized. One way to test our hypothesis would be to see
whether a more centralized schooling system changes the estimated e↵ect of the Qing persecutions
on basic education. Going beyond our sample of 70 year olds, we now include all individuals who
were at least 15 years old in 1982.
Compared to urban China, basic education in rural China was more informal and decentralized.
State building e↵orts in rural areas began in the late 19th century but never made major progress
(Kuhn, 2002). Rural China was much less a↵ected by the centralizing policies of both Nationalist
and Communist governments. If it is true that literary inquisitions mainly a↵ected basic education
through the channel of social capital, the e↵ect should be much stronger for rural China. In keeping
with this prediction, when we split the sample, we find a negative e↵ect of literary inquisition for
the rural sample, but not for the urban sample (Table A.26).71
The di↵erence between rural and urban China provides the first source of variation in the
degree of centralization and formalization in the schooling system that we exploit. The second
source of variation is engendered by the educational campaign by both Nationalist and Communist
governments starting from the 1930s. With the 1982 census, we can utilize this source of variation by
exploiting cohort-to-cohort di↵erences in educational levels. Following the same logic as in Section
V.B.1, we identify cohorts of individuals who were educated under a decentralized schooling system,
as well as cohorts of individuals educated under a centralized system. They are individuals who were
born before 1929 (decentralized schooling), individuals born between 1929 and 1959 (centralized
schooling), and individuals born after 1959 (decentralized schooling). If we are right about social
capital being a channel underlying the persistent e↵ects of literary inquisitions, the e↵ects should
be strongest for individuals born before 1929 and after 1959.
In June 1935, the Nationalist government passed a compulsory education law. The provision of
basic education was no longer just a product of local decisions. E↵orts to formalize and centralize
basic education continued during the Communist period. In line with our prediction, the estimated
e↵ect of literary inquisitions on basic education is halved for individuals born after 1929 and before
1959, compared to the estimated e↵ect for individuals before 1929.
The schooling system went through another phase of decentralization during the Cultural Rev-
olution. After 1965, the responsibilities of basic education was increasingly delegated to local com-
munities, referred to as “production brigades”.72 Increased reliance on local communities is evident
in aggregate statistics: education spending was 6.36% of the state budget in 1966, and decreased
to 4.24% in 1970. As soon as primary and secondary education increased reliance on local funding,
71We cannot rule out the alternative explanation that cultural values are simply less persistent in an urban setting.
Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2012), for example, find that the transmission of medieval antisemitism was attenuated in
larger cities.
72During the Maoist period, “production brigades” were the basic accounting and farming production unit in the
people’s commune system of the People’s Republic of China. Most of these were replaced by villages after 1984.
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the gap in access to basic education between a↵ected and una↵ected prefectures re-emerged. For
cohorts born after 1959 and educated during the Cultural Revolution, the e↵ect of literary inquisi-
tions on basic education is comparable to what it was under previous episodes of decentralization
(Table A.27). Note that the gap in basic education between a↵ected and una↵ected prefectures
re-emerged after being subject to a centralized schooling system for a long period (⇡ 30 years),
suggesting that our finding cannot be easily explained by human capital or more transitory aspects
of school building.
To summarize, our analysis based on literacy outcomes in the 1982 census, indicates that the
Qing persecutions was associated with the under provision of basic education. We establish causality
with two instrument variables. Our findings are robust to accounting for major shocks such as the
Taiping Rebellion, exodus to Taiwan and the Cultural Revolution. The negative e↵ect of literary
inquisitions on basic education is muted for the urban sample and much smaller for generations
educated in a centralized schooling system. This provides further evidence that the e↵ect of literary
inquisitions on basic education indeed operated through the channel of social capital.
VI Political Repression, Political Attitudes and Authoritarian
Resilience
We have gone to considerable lengths to provide evidence that the Qing persecutions reduced
social capital. One important characteristic of social capital is that it is associated with higher
political participation. Putnam (2001) argued that low social capital undermines both civic en-
gagement and reduces the willingness of individuals to participate in politics. So do we see a lower
level of political participation in prefectures a↵ected by literary inquisitions in the past? Important
as this question is for testing our social capital hypothesis, it is also of independent interest as active
political participation is crucial for the transition from autocracy to democracy.
It is not an easy task to think about political participation in China—most forms of political
participation such as protests and competitive election are illegal in today’s China. Also, the fact
that China remains autocratic today makes it di cult to know whether the lack of political par-
ticipation is due to apathy or disapproval of autocracy. Fortunately, there is a form of political
participation we can readily examine: volunteering on local committees or making suggestions to
local committees. Local committees are self-governed, and are not part of the autocratic govern-
ment.73 Attitudes towards autocracy per se will not contaminate our results.
In Table 6 we investigate the impact of the Qing persecutions on attitudes and behavior as-
sociated with political participation using data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS).
We start with attitudinal questions. In columns 1-2, individuals in prefectures with a legacy of
literary inquisitions say they are less likely to think that people like themselves can have an impact
on government. We interpret this as reflecting disinterest in politics, or political apathy. But as
explained earlier, this attitude can be specific to the type of regime governing modern China: had
it not been for the fact that China is an autocracy, the same respondents could have a very di↵erent
73We include both committees for urban residents (juweihui) and for rural residents (cunweihui).
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Table 6: Authoritarian Resilience? Evidence from Political and Social Participation
Logit
Political Apathy Volunteering on Making Suggestions
Local Committees to Local Committees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of Dep. Var 3.540 3.546 0.0677 0.0666 0.121 0.121
Literary Inquisition 0.199⇤⇤ 0.134⇤ -0.753⇤⇤ -1.080⇤⇤⇤ -0.435⇤ -0.693⇤⇤
(0.0815) (0.0746) (0.360) (0.419) (0.248) (0.290)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemporary Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2/ Pseudo R2 0.0507 0.0543 0.0397 0.0485 0.0495 0.0577
Observations 3320 3224 3280 3184 3335 3238
This table reports estimates of the relationship between literary inquisitions and modern po-
litical participation using a Logit model. All specifications include socioeconomic macroregion
fixed e↵ects. Columns 1-2 examine the relationship between literary inquisition and political
apathy. “Do you think people like yourself can have an impact on government?” The answer
is scaled between 1-5. Columns 3-4 explore if literary inquisition predicts whether individuals
have volunteered to work on local committees. Columns 5-6 examine if literary inquisition
predicts whether individuals make suggestions to local committees. The answers for these
questions are binary (“Yes” or “No”). Individual controls include fixed e↵ects for gender,
age, and the level of education. Contemporary controls include log GDP per capita, log
population in 2010, years of schooling, share of urban population and share of agricultural
workforce. Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level and are reported in
parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
answer to this question. Next, we consider political behavior. We focus on political participation in
self-governed local committees. Our main findings are survey respondents from a↵ected prefectures
are less likely to volunteer on local committees or to make suggestions to local committees (columns
3-6).74 These findings parallel conclusions drawn from studies in Eastern Europe, where exposure
to Communist rule has left a legacy of non-participation and cynicism towards politics, resulting
in an “impoverished public sphere”.75 Such di↵erences in political attitudes and behavior are not
related to di↵erences in the level of individualism or collectivism. As shown in Table A.32, literary
inquisitions have no e↵ect on collectivism.
Political apathy has implications for China’s current political trajectory. Many scholars antic-
ipate China undergoing a democratic transition as it develops. For this transition to take place,
however, there need to be a critical mass of supporters and individuals willing to advocate for de-
mocratization at their own expense. In the meantime, although China has partially democratized
its institutions at the village level, research suggests that local elections function most e↵ectively in
villages with higher levels of social capital (Martinez-Bravo, Miquel, Qian, and Yao, 2014; Martinez-
Bravo, Padro-i-Miquel, Qian, Xu, and Yao, 2017).
74In all specifications, we control for human capital as literary inquisitions have a↵ected education and human
capital accumulation in the past, and there can certainly be a persistence in human capital.
75See Bernhard (1996) and Mishler and Rose (1997), and Howard (2003). In particular, post-Communist societies
are characterized by lower membership in civic organizations. Bernhard and Karakoc¸ (2007) discuss the extent to
which this is a general phenomenon characteristic of post-totalitarian societies.
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Related concerns have been expressed by writers from Orwell (1948) and Arendt (1951) onwards
who pointed to the danger that autocracies would produce populations incapable of self-governance
and thus well suited for autocratic rule. Our findings suggest that literary inquisitions indeed left
a legacy that lowers the ability to take collective action and worsens the quality of self governance,
creating unfavorable conditions for democracy.
Next, we consider whether the Qing persecutions have a↵ected attitudes towards autocracy.
The question under which conditions will individuals acquiesce to authoritarian rule is of vital
importance. Field experiments such as the Stanford Prison Experiment have attempted to address
it, but the experiment had to be shut down only six days after it began. Individuals began to play
their role as accomplices in the prison “autocracy”, but it remains a puzzle what caused them to
change their behavior. Our approach exploits historical variation in the perception of autocratic
rule.
One fear is that individuals inured to autocratic rule may be used to being directed by the state
and hence not believe local elections or democracy to be worthwhile. This is not what we find. The
Chinese Political Compass (CPoC) contains questions on political ideology. Table 7 considers three
di↵erent questions in the CPoC asking about individuals’ views over alternative political systems.
We find that individuals in prefectures with a legacy of literary inquisitions are in fact less likely
to agree with the following statements: “Western-style multi-party systems are not suitable for
China” (columns 1-3), “Free speech is ‘western’ and will only cause social disorder” (columns 4-6),
and “Modern China needs to be guided by wisdom of Confucius/Confucian thinking” (columns 7-9).
In areas a↵ected by literary inquisitions, individuals, if anything, are more likely to have warmer
feelings towards liberalism. They are more likely to be skeptical about resorting to a traditional
Confucian culture that has long complemented autocratic rule.76 Whereas for other questions in the
survey, such as when it comes to questions regarding social issues, there is no discernible di↵erence
between prefectures with a legacy of literary inquisitions and those with no such past. Our results
are robust to controlling for access to the internet (columns 2, 5 and 7), and to adding the full set
of controls used in our analysis of basic education (columns 3, 6 and 9).77
This provides evidence that the impact the Qing persecutions have exerted on the autocratic
resilience of China is not a simple political preference story. We find no evidence that literary
inquisitions transformed regional culture to be more pro-autocracy. However, taking Tables 6 and
7 together, a meaningful pattern emerges: individuals in prefectures which had a legacy of literary
inquisitions are more likely to be supportive of a more liberal political order, but due to a lack of
interest in politics and public a↵airs, are unlikely to act on their thoughts and ideas. This means
76As we discuss in Appendix 1.F, the Qing depended heavily on Confucianism in their propaganda. Despite the
Communist revolution, the link between Confucianism and autocracy remains unbroken. The recent strengthening
of autocratic power in China has been accompanied by a renewed emphasis on Confucianism (see Elliott, 2012; Kai,
2014).
77We do not find that other more recent shocks such as the Cultural Revolution have an e↵ect on political attitudes
(coe cients are positive but insignificant). This is likely due to the Cultural Revolution persecutions being based
around the principle of class struggle and not directed by the central government. Factors such as the preexisting
levels of inequality and the intensity of the class struggle in a region as well as local quotas of class enemies imposed
by the Communist Party were highly significant in account for the pattern of deaths observed (see Bai and Jia, 2016).
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compared to individuals in una↵ected prefectures, they are less influential in national politics. In
other words, autocratic rule has led to “adverse selection” in political participation, which helps
to strengthen the resilience of autocratic rule. On the flip side, this suggests that there may be
underexploited popular support for democracy.
These findings have broader implications for how we think about political reform in long-
standing autocracies. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that the emergence of democratic values is
an important precondition for the success of democratization. Furthermore, their reasoning suggests
that it is crucial that those with democratic values participate in the political process. Reforming
or overthrowing autocratic regimes requires both coordination and individuals who are willing to
engage in political protests at a high personal cost and little personal benefit. Recent research on
the democratic protest movements in Hong Kong by Cantoni, Yang, Yuchtman, and Zhang (2016,
2017) seeks to understand the conditions under which anti-authoritarianism movements will fail
and under what circumstances they are likely to succeed. Cantoni, Yang, Yuchtman, and Zhang
(2016) find that those individuals who are most likely to coordinate opposition to authoritarian
regimes are individuals who are particularly risk tolerant and willing to incur personal costs for
social benefits.
We show that in prefectures with a legacy of political repression, individuals do not necessarily
have less democratic values. But rather, they are less interested in participating in politics. Our
analysis suggests that a legacy of political repression suppresses the participation of individuals
who are otherwise the most likely to protest against autocratic rule based on their political views.
Autocratic rule results in political quietism that may make the task of building democracy more
di cult.
VII Conclusions
This paper traces out the impact of political repression on social capital. The literary inquisi-
tions (1661-1788) undertaken by Qing China marked a period of sustained repression. We first show
that this repression had a noticeable impact on the number of individuals becoming well known.
Our main finding from the historical panel is that literary inquisitions reduced the number of local
charities. This e↵ect is long-lasting: the resulting gap in the number of local charities between
a↵ected and una↵ected prefectures did not close thereafter.
The Qing persecutions lasted for over a hundred years so there was time for cultural beliefs
about the dangers associated with political participation and social activism to be developed and
inculcated in the local population. Over decades, such beliefs were reinforced. Parents had an
incentive to instill in their children the types of attitudes that would ensure their safety in an auto-
cratic political system, and those beliefs were likely perpetuated via intergenerational transmission
(as in Bisin and Verdier, 2001).
Evidence from post-Qing China strongly supports our hypothesis that political repression per-
manently reduced social capital. The negative e↵ects of literary inquisitions survived even after
China’s political and economic institutions were transformed. Individuals in a↵ected prefectures
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have a lower level of trust today. Throughout the 20th century, a↵ected prefectures saw worse
provision of basic education, and this was especially true when and where institutions were de-
centralized and the provision was informal. We observe pervasive political apathy and depressed
political participation in prefectures with a legacy of literary inquisitions. We discuss how this might
have contributed to a vicious cycle whereby autocracy becomes solidified in part by generating a
society lacking the capacity to resist it.
“The nature and extent of social capital in society is critically related to the behavior and
policies of the state” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2016, p. 39). Authoritarian resilience cannot be
understood without recognizing how autocratic rule has a↵ected the development of civil society.
A developed civil society can play a crucial role in constraining the development of an autocratic
state. But an strong autocratic state itself impedes the development of such a vibrant civil society.
This insight is consistent with the observation that the stability of imperial autocracy in China is
attributable to the fact that “the Chinese emperors were able to inhibit the formation of autonomous
social groups outside the control of the state” (Fu, 1994, p. 141). This was largely accomplished by
recruiting elites into a centralized bureaucracy. But for a long time, new social groups were able to
form and innovation and new ideas were tolerated. Despite the restrictions that individuals faced,
China did develop a nascent civil society characterized by intellectual participation in society during
the late Ming (Rowe, 1993). However, the status of civil society organizations was always fragile
(Simon, 2013, p. xxvii). When the Qing regime faced political challenges that previous regimes
did not have to face, it strove to establish an orthodoxy. The outcome was that the state came to
dominate civil society completely: the system in which the state had the absolute power eventually
worked to eradicate dissent and disagreement, silencing civil society.
Literary inquisitions were not characterized by mass violence as occurred, for instance, during
the Ming-Qing transition. However, the impact of a prolonged period of terror, accompanied by
occasional high profile cases was dramatic. Society adapted culturally in response to this climate of
fear. Scholars such as Xie (1990) and Liu (2000); and Liu, Wang, and Wang (2005) speculate that
the style of government that developed under the Qing prompted individuals to keep to the private
sphere and not to engage in public a↵airs. This is the first paper to provide systematic evidence
that this was the case.
Certainly, after 1840 local charities went through a phase of growth across China. This was in
part due to local regions gaining more autonomy and to the influence of the West. An interesting
question here is: how would civil society have developed in the China in the absence of literary
inquisitions. This counterfactual is impossible to assess but our findings suggest that local charities
in a↵ected prefectures would have followed a very di↵erent path and that the number of local
charities would have been much higher for those prefectures after 1840. Given that those prefectures
were quite advanced regions that were high literary and economically developed, a stunted civil
society and a discouraged intellectual class led to a much smaller role for them in national politics,
despite their superior economic position.78
78But we cannot assess the impact of the Qing persecutions on the economically and political most advanced part
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Setting our findings in the context of the Great Divergence debate, we see political repression
during the Qing regime as exerting an important impact on the path of imperial China after 1700.
It is clear that an environment in which intellectuals feared standing out or being di↵erent, was not
best suited for innovation and the exchange of ideas. The vibrant intellectual culture present in
the late Ming did not have an opportunity to keep growing into the Qing period. Parker observes,
the Qing period saw “intellectual innovation and much ‘useful knowledge’ as a potential threat,
not a potential asset . . . China’s new masters refused to allow their leading scholars either freedom
of expression or freedom to exchange ideas” (Parker, 2013, p. 667). Thus, during the period that
Habermas (1962 [1989]) and Mokyr (2016) detect the origins of a public sphere in western Europe,
by spreading distrust and encouraging isolation among intellectuals, literary inquisitions helped to
create an inhospitable environment for intellectual discourse.
It is important to keep in mind that there was several factors specific to our historical setting.
The response of intellectuals in China to political repression were shaped by the Confucian ideal
of self-preservation.79 The prominent place given to the teaching of horrific historical episodes by
the older generations, such as “burning the books and burying the intellectuals” probably also
amplified intellectuals’ reactions when they witnessed a literary inquisition case implicate their
peers. Additionally, the ability to write and voice opinions were a core part of the gentry’s identity.
Nonetheless, our study is highly relevant for other arts of the world beyond China. Social cap-
ital plays a prominent role in many explanations of political development (Tocqueville, 1835/1840
(2000); Putnam, 1994; Martinez-Bravo, Padro-i-Miquel, Qian, Xu, and Yao, 2017). Our findings
have implications for both authoritarian regimes and established democracies. A legacy of autoc-
racy can help shed light on the resilience of authoritarian rule in countries such as Russia or Turkey
whereas in democracies like America, scholars such as Putnam (1994) and Skocpol (2003) have
voiced concern about what implications declining social capital has for the long-run prospects of
liberal democracy. We provide new quantitative evidence that political repression reduces social
capital in both the short and the long run. By studying how authoritarianism and low social capital
are intertwined, our study provides novel evidence for how culture and political development a↵ect
one another.
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